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The Executive Office of the President has grovm dramatically in
responsibility and size since the Great Depression.
It is important for
presidents to organize their staff in a way that allows them to focus on
the broad-based goals of the administration. To win Congressional
support for his initiatives, presidents must utilize the Office of
Congressional Relations (OCR) to lobby for the administration’s
programs.
The proper organization of the OCR requires that the president
takes time to communicate with his subordinates. A chief of staff must
limit access to the president and take upon himself duties that ensure
the president's wishes are being carried out.
The case study of the Carter administration's energy bill
demonstrates that the President did not organize his staff in such a way
as to increase the likelihood of the legislation's passage. Carter's
reticence to engage his staff in a social exchange with Congress
detrimentally slowed the legislative process. The resulting arduous and
lengthy process contributed to the perception that the Carter
administration was in disarray.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The office of the American Presidency has changed dramatically over
time.

In response to increased public expectations of the president,

executive responsibility has also multiplied.

The growth of White House

staff is a principal consequence of this change.

As demands on the

president to solve the nation's problems increase, so too does his
reliance on staff.

Staffers are intricately involved in policy

advising, policy making, and the development and implementation of
political strategy in pursuit of the president's agenda.^

The expanding

role of staffers has required an increase in their numbers, which in
turn complicates the president's task of coordinating his legislative
program.

2

This tJiesis contends that a president's ability to pass his
legislative agenda is partially dependent on how he organizes and
manages his staff.

It centers on the presidential management of staff

and how it affects the passage of legislation through Congress.

The

historical evolution of the president's staff is discussed to
demonstrate the importance and necessity of staff support.

President

Jimmy Carter's general management of the White House staff, and in
particular the effect his style had on the Congressional Liaison Staff's
ability to lobby Capitol Hill, is of particular interest.

The manner

the chief executive directs his staffers influences the overall
legislative success of the administration.
skills are critical.^

The president's management

The chief executive's failure to get what he
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wants from the disparate congressional membership results in an
ineffective administration.
Congress and the public have both turned to the president for
answers to complex problems facing society in the modern era.

With the

Great Depression, the people turned to the president in hopes he could
alleviate the poor economic times.

Given these expectations, much of

the legislation considered by Congress is now proposed by the chief
executive.*

Since the president is the prime initiator and coordinator

of the government, executive officials also anticipate presidential
direction and guidance on how to implement policy.^

The management and

organization of the White House staff also provides the administration
with the ability to meet the increasing responsibilities of the
executive office.
As the United States government's responsibilities grew, the
president's tasks and duties became increasingly varied.

While the

chief executive's job has always been too large for one person, this
growth made his tasks even more difficult to accomplish.

Staff

assistance is needed to promote the administration's policies on Capitol
Hill.

Promoting the president's programs to Congress helps the White

House maintain linkages with legislators and foster a congenial working
relationship between the executive and legislative branches.
The president's first responsibility regarding his staff, then, is
to organize and mobilize the executive branch to address those tasks.
This point is especially important if the chief executive wants to
pursue an agenda that breaks from the past, since new policy directions
are often met with resistance from Congress and interest groups.
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Given this inevitable resistance to his policies the ability for
the president to have his staff organized before the term begins becomes
even more important.

The chief executive must make a successful

transition from campaigning to governing in order to increase the
chances of legislative victories.
difficult;

However, successful transitions are

what it takes to get elected president is quite different

from governing.

Richard Rose notes that because a candidate consumes

himself with the arduous task of getting elected, he does not think much
about what he is going to do once elected.

But upon inauguration, the

president should be able to " h i t the ground running" to capitalize on
his electoral victory.^

Since each administration potentially has only

eight years to accomplish its goals, the president needs to have
managerial control over his staff so he can coordinate his objectives.
A president who does not make a successful transition by preparing the
White House staff will fail to achieve many of the goals of the
administration.
Having the White House ready to " h i t the ground running" also
increases the likelihood that the administration can take advantage of
the less contentious political atmosphere accompanying the outset of the
term.

At the moment of inauguration, the president has his greatest

amount of support from the voters because they want the president to
succeed.^

During this "honeymoon period," the president's

relationship with Congress is also the least turbulent,®

Legislators

are tentatively open to the new president's leadership because the chief
executive has not yet presented controversial legislation which a
Congress member's constituents may dislike.
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Members of Congress also tentatively welcome a new administration
because the White House may pursue a bargaining relationship with
Capitol Hill.

Just as the president wants to pass legislation. Congress

wants to push through their agenda.

But an administration that does not

seek out a congenial working relationship with Congress may alienate
legislators.

Members of Congress will feel unimportant and ignored by

the administration if a relationship based on bargaining and compromise
is not established.

This relationship includes allowing legislators to

have a say in White House proposals.

Having a legislative staff working

with members of Congress, building coalitions of support for
initiatives, goes a long way toward ensuring legislative success.
Once offended, Capitol Hill will be less likely to support the
chief executive's proposals throughout the administration's term.

The

ability to "hit the ground running" thus contributes to the White
House's legislative effectiveness over the entirety of the
administration's term.
Johnson, states that:

George Reedy, an aide to former President Lyndon
" i f the president gets along well with the

Congress in the beginning, he may be able to carry [support for his
initiatives] past the initial period.

But if he gets off on the wrong
Q
foot, he'll never be able to shake [the bad relationship]."
Former

White House chief of staff H.R. Haldeman also notes the importance of
the administration establishing a congenial connection with Capitol Hill
is critical because as soon as the president takes office, his power
begins eroding and the window of opportunity to pass legislation gets
s m a l l e r . H a l d e m a n believes that it is inevitable that the chief
executive's influence will diminish because at some point legislators
will be alienated by the president's agenda.

Therefore, to retard this
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diminishing executive influence, a president must seek out a good
relationship with Congress to decrease the likelihood that early
mistakes will hurt the president's chances for passage of initiatives in
the future.
Given the benefits of organizing the executive staff organization
to increase the president's legislative success, key research questions
include;

1.How the management of staff affects the focus of the
administration's staffers on the President's goals;
2. How the management of staff affects the likelihood of
congressional passage of legislation; and
3. What lessons from the Carter administration are useful to the
management and organization of future White House staffs.

The hypothesis in this examination asserts that the more direction
presidents give staffers, the more successful their administrations will
be at lobbying Congress.

The clearer a president articulates what he

wants to accomplish in office, the more focused the staff will be on the
administration's goals.

Conversely, a chief executive who does not

guide his staff will find his administration in disarray.

Without

coordination, other members of the administration may propose
legislation on Capitol Hill without the president's knowledge or
support.

Operationalization and Scope
The elements of effective management have only been implied up to
this point.

For the purpose of this study, effective management

purports three elements.

First, enhancing legislative success requires
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that, the president articulates goals to his staff in a clear and
prioritized fashion.

Once the president articulates to his staff what

he wants and expects, and what initiatives to pursue, the staff will be
able to communicate coherently this information to Congress.
Conversely, confusion over what the president wants, and what issues
should be addressed first, leaves the administration in disarray, and
sends the Congress confusing and contradictory messages.
Second, presidents must direct staffers to lobby and bargain with
members of Congress.

To the extent that a president requires his

congressional liaison staff to consult Congress on critical executive
proposals, the chances for policy passage increases.

If the president

does not ensure his liaison staff maintains constant contact with
legislators, and seeks their input on important legislation,
presidential initiatives will most likely fail.
Third, the administration must be hierarchically organized to
ensure that staffers receive proper direction and work towards the
president's goals.

This organizational structure allows the president

to remain focused on the most important issues confronting the
administration.

12

The chief executive does not have time to address

every policy issue, and therefore must rely on staff to investigate
problems, review policy options, and carry out his wishes.

A clearly

defined chain of command decreases the possibility that staffers will
stray from the administration's goals to pursue a personal ideological
agenda antithetical to the president's goals.
One way to help avoid these organizational problems is to utilize a
chief of staff.

One of the duties of a chief of staff is to limit

access to the chief executive and delegate duties and tasks to staffers
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thus allowing the president to focus on broad issues and
responsibilities.^^

Because the chief of staff delegates

responsibilities, his duties also include keeping staffers focused on
the president's goals and making sure the president's agenda is being
followed.

Since the chief of staff inevitably comes into a vast amount

of contact with staffers, he addresses minor problems that surface
inside the White House.

For example, if a dispute arises, the chief of

staff will mediate between staffers and make a decision.

While the

chief of staff is of secondary focus in this paper, the experiences of
presidents who have not chosen to organize the White House
hierarchically with a chief of staff demonstrate the necessity of
utilizing such a powerful staff position.
Before assessing the Carter administration, the growing importance
of the V/hite House staff shall be discussed in a historical overview of
the development of the staff system.

The overview traces how and why

the White House staff grew, and how it was managed.
A general overview of Carter's management style will also be
examined, followed by a case study of his legislative liaison's
interaction with Congress regarding the administration's energy
proposal.

An analysis of Carter's management technique sheds light on

how his style affected his relationship with Congress eind, ultimately,
the passage of the energy package.

The energy package is important in

this study because he thought it would define the success of his term.
Before examining the case study, a clear description of the modern
functions of the Office of Congressional Relations (OCR) should be
explained.

Carter's relationship and management of the OCR is the focus

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

8

of the case study in regard to the energy proposals examined in Chapter
Four.
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CHAPTER 2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF:

AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The president did not have a staff office like the Office of
Congressional Relations at the beginning of the Republic because the
founders frowned upon too much executive intrusion into the
legislature's business.

Therefore, there was no staff organization, and

the president accomplished his tasks with little help.

As the

government grew, however, so did the need for staff to free the
president from less important tasks.

Problems in the m o d e m world have

become increasingly complicated, and the solutions to such problems have
also become complex.

For example, the Great Depression resulted in

people expecting the government to manage the economy in order to avoid
another economic crisis.^

As a result, many staff offices now take on a

greater role than just accomplishing such tasks as sorting the mail or
typing a note for the president.

As the president has become a prime

initiator in proposing legislation, staffers presently help the
president formulate proposals and lobby for passage of legislation.
This chapter examines the importance of staff and major trends in
staff development, which will offer a glimpse into the importance of
staff in the m o d e m presidency.

The different way presidents manage

their staffs also provides insight into the difficulties they face in
staff organization.
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Origins of the Executive Staff

The concept of an inner body of advisors derives from America's
British heritage.

King Henry II believed that he needed a council of

trusted and faithful advisors chosen by himself to further the
monarchy's programs.

In the same vein, the founders of the Republic

left to the chief executive the option of organizing an advisory body,
rather than creating a separate advisory body for him.

Some framers

thought that such a body would be necessary to insulate the president
from possible damaging problems.

Others believed such insulation of the

president problematic because he could then do as the King of Englsmd
did:

unjustly, and irresponsibly, blame his staff for bad advice.^

They thought that the president of the United States should be
responsible for his decisions and not be protected by a coterie of
advisors.
Many of the founders wanted the executive to remain a singular
institution because, without several unelected staffers in the White
House, the presidential office would represent unified leadership.^
Alexander Hamilton opined in Federalist Paper Seventy that, in the
Executive Branch:
No favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the
disadvantages of dissension in the executive department.
[The sinful character of several human beings working in the
White House] serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of
plan or measure which they relate, from the first step to
the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract
those qualities in the executive which are the most
necessary ingredients in its composition— vigor and
expedition.

Hamilton's admonition was a reaction to the presumed negative effects of
staff and an advisory system in relation to human ambition:
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One of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the
executive...is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy
responsibility...It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual
accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the
punishment of a pernicious measure, or a series of
pernicious measures, ought to fall...The circumstances which
may have led to a national miscarriage or misfortune are
sometimes so complicated that where there are a number of
actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of
agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there
has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to
pronounce to whose account the evil which may have incurred
is truly chargeable.

Needless to say, Hamilton did not support a vastly staffed Executive.
He feared that, just like the King, the president could blame council
for his own bad decisions.

The president could also claim that council

divisions precluded better resolution on certain issues.^

Therefore,

the Constitution omitted formal recognition of staff.
The Constitution did allow, however, for written opinions from
subordinates which would allow one to pinpoint responsibility for
governmental decisions.

8

While not many expected that department heads

would become the president's principal advisors, in 1791 President
George Washington encouraged his vice-president and department
secretaries (State, War, Treasury, and the Attorney General) to consult
each other on issues.

Eventually, Washington met with these men to

discuss problems of the day and to develop political strategy.

James

Monroe referred to this group as the "president's cabinet" whose
responsibility was to counsel, as well as support, the chief executive.^
Despite this input from the vice-president cind department
secretaries, Washington and the second United States President, John
Adams, complained about the workload facing their administrations.
1789 Congress allocated money for assistance to the president.^®
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legislators increased the president's salary to cover expenses for
hiring a personal secretary aind a few clerks.
To relieve his workload, Washington also utilized Tobias Lear, his
personal secretary, as a liaison between the White House and Congress.

11

Lear's role was especially important because Congress' disparate makeup
made it difficult to affect legislation.

As Washington noted;

The impossibility that one man should be able to perform all
the great business of the state [was] the reason for
instituting the great departments, and appointing officers
therein, to assist the supreme magistrate in discharging the
duties of his trust.
Still, the duties of the executive office increased and surpassed
the work hours available from the cabinet and advisors.

Secretary of

State John Quincy Adams noted that when he worked for President James
Monroe, he frequently received documents eighteen months after Monroe
obtained them.

Adams concluded that the demands on, and workload of,

the president caused chronic delays and backlogging of the government's
business beyond what the cabinet could keep up with.^^

Nevertheless,

for the next one-hundred and forty years, the cabinet remained the
president's principal advisory group and staff support system.

Among

its many duties, the cabinet assisted the president by lobbying for
certain measures originating on Capitol Hill.
In the nineteenth century, the White House had very little to do
with the legislative process because Congress created and proposed all
bills.

When the president disagreed with certain proposals, legislative

leaders were usually powerful enough to stop the White House from
effecting any kind of c h a n g e , E v e n though the president was
interested in certain pieces of legislation, overall, legislative
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actions were not a matter of intense concern for the chief executive
because he had more burdens emanating from non-legislative
15
correspondence.
Nineteenth-century presidents continued to utilize personal aides
and servants, as well as department secretaries, to assist in the
political duties of the executive office.

The salaries of these

executive staffers came out of the president's own p o c k e t . I n

1825

James Monroe became the first president to lodge formally a complaint
with Congress that he did not have a sufficient staff or fiscal
resources to cope with the demands of the o f f i c e . T h o u g h they did not
act immediately on this complaint. Congress eventually decided to
increase the appropriation for more staff.

But it was Adams who began

the trend that led the presidency away from sole reliance on the cabinet
towards the creation of a formal White House staff whose exclusive
responsibility and loyalty laid with the president.

Unlike secretaries,

staffers would not have to report to Congress and lobby the legislature
for appropriations.

They would only have to report to the president who

hired and fired them.
Andrew Jackson adopted Adams's staffing ideas and became the first
chief executive to move away from the use of the cabinet in favor of a
"coterie" of personal advisors.

18

Jackson noticed that his

secretaries were beholden to their own interests which were generated by
dealing with their department personnel.

They lacked what he thought

were "the necessary standards of selflessness and candor" needed in a
staffer.

19

Jackson believed that only a candid personal staff/advisor

could relate which goals were realistically attainable.

He also thought

that staffers should carry out the president's wishes faithfully.
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15

the organization of Jackson's White House staff and advisors went
unduplicated in subsequent administrations, the need for more immediate
administrative help was addressed in the following administrations.
In 1857, Congress authorized a salary of $2,500 a year for a
private secretary; $1,200 a year for a steward to take charge of the
White House domestic establishment; and $900 for a part-time messenger.
By the time Abraham Lincoln was elected president, the personal
secretary evolved into an invaluable position for the chief executive.
The secretary began to take on "chief of staff" responsibilities;
directing subordinates and managing access to the president.

Abrsihcun Lincoln's Precedent Setting Personal Secretary

The election of President Lincoln prompted one his most famous
unscripted speeches.

As he boarded the railroad for Washington D.C.,

several Illinois friends shook his hand and congratulated him as he made
his way to the train and began to speak:
My friends— no one not in my situation can appreciate my
feeling of sadness at this parting.
To this place, and the
kindness of these people, I owe everything. Here I have
lived for a quarter of a century, and have passed from a
young to an old man. Here my children have been b o m . and
one is buried.
I now leave, not knowing when, or whether
ever, I may return, with a task before me greater than that
which rested on Washington. Without the assistance of that
Divine Being...I cannot succeed. With [His] assistance I
cannot fail. Trusting in Him, who can go with me, and
remain with you and be everywhere for good, let us
confidently hope that all will be well. To His care
commending you, as I hope in your progress you will commend
me, I bid you an affectionate farewell.

As the train pulled away a breathless reporter rushed up to the
president and asked him if he could have a copy of the speech "before
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his noble words were lost forever.''

Lincoln then made a feeble

attempt to write dovm the spontaneous speech when his personal
secretary, John George Nicolay, seized the writing utensil from him and
finished the task.

Author Michael Medved states that:

"it seemed

entirely appropriate [that] one of Lincoln's most celebrated public
utterances should come down to us through [an] intermediary"— a
staffer.

Medved believes this action becomes more understandable only

when taking into account the duties staffers are responsible for in the
m o d e m political age.

Nicolay performed at that time what has become

the normal operating procedure for staffers in the m o d e m age— writing
and transcribing the president's speeches.
Nicolay left quite an imprint on the presidential office because of
his unprecedented, wide, and varied duties.

With the Civil War

underway, he guarded access to Lincoln so the President could
concentrate on the war.

Nicolay made Congressmen who previously had

unlimited access to the Oval Office wait.

This angered several

legislators because no "staffer" had ever had such power before.

24

Nicolay also read, answered, and summarized the president's mail.

His

duties further included reading and summarizing newspapers, and writing
opinion pieces for the New York Tribune.

While Nicolay had wide and

varied duties, his responsibilities did not include relations with
Congress.

However, his precedent-setting responsibilities paved the way

for further increases in executive responsibilities.
Teddy Roosevelt became the first president to present legislation
to Congress.

This action was controversial because only the leaders of

each chamber decided the legislative agenda and presented such
legislation to Congress.

25

Roosevelt also used his office and limited
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staff to lobby the Hill on proposals being considered in Congress.
Though Roosevelt did not propose these measures, he publicly took credit
for initiatives such as the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.
Roosevelt's actions increased the public expectations of the executive
office and opened the door for future presidents to generate legislation
and present it to Congress.
President Woodrow Wilson continued the trend set by Roosevelt.
Just before taking office he wrote that a chief executive "must be the
prime minister, as much concerned with the guidance of legislation as
with the just and orderly execution of law, and he is the spokesman of
27
the Nation in everything.' '

Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Brownlow Report

Prior to FDR's administration, no formal White House staff offices
existed.

If the president's own personal secretary could not assume

some of the burdens of the office, employees were borrowed from the
departments.

However, this practice eventually subsided.

The use of

cabinet members as advisors lost its appeal steadily throughout the
1800s-1900s because many presidents wanted a staff more dependent on,
and solely answerable to, them.

In turn, the White House staff gained

prominence atnd became the primary advisory amd lobbying entity for the
president.

The increased importance of staff resulted in centralizing

the executive's operations.
FDR's legacy forever changed what the populace expected the federal
government could and should do.

Many scholars note that FDR marked the
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beginning of the m o d e m presidency because of the dramatic expansion of
supporting offices, agencies, and staff of the executive office.

23

With the advent of the Great Depression, FDR found that he needed
more help than the existing staff could provide.

29

The public expected

the president to relieve the country of the effects of the poor economy.
The impact of the Great Depression rendered theories of limited
government obsolete.^®

The economic collapse forced the president to

take a more proactive role in legislation facing the House and Senate.
The president's new role meant he would need more staff to lobby
Congress.
Since the citizenry looked to the president, not Congress, for
leadership during the poor economic times, the chief executive set the
domestic legislative agenda.

In this way, FDR changed the nature of the

office to an activist presidential office.

But the aggressive rate at

which he wanted to create new organizations and restructure the
governmental bureaucracy disturbed even avid "N e w Dealers,"

31

To

assuage the perception that his plan to reorganize the executive was
drastic, FDR attempted to coordinate newly created agencies with old
ones by forming the ''Emergency Council" in 1934 to streamline the
administration.
confusion.

32

However, the meetings were huge and created

Instead of allaying fears about FDR's activism, controversy

increased.
In 1937 FDR commissioned the "President's Committee on
Administrative Management'' to research ways the president could be
h e l p e d . Public-administration scholar Louis Brownlow chaired the
committee and affirmed in his findings that the president needed help.
Brownlow wrote that the president's "staff was inadequate to fulfill
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[his n e e d s ] . T h e

Brownlow Committee recommended hiring four

presidential aides including:

a special counsel, an executive clerk,

appointments secretary, and a press secretary.

These staffers were to

be "possessed of high competence and have a passion for anonymity.

35

The report stated that:
These aides would have no power to make decisions or issue
instructions in their own right. They would not be
interposed between the president and the heads of his
departments.
They would remain in the background, issue no
orders, make no decisions, [and] emit no public
statements.

Brownlow wrote that he and FDR were very close in thought on " h o w
to establish a simple but effective machinery which [would] enable [the
president] to exercise managerial control appropriate to the burden of
responsibility imposed upon him by the Constitution."

37

The Brownlow

committee report intended to create an executive branch that could meet
the needs of the "developing administrative state."

However, FDR

went beyond what Brownlow intended, using the report to reorganize the
whole White House bureaucratic structure.

The Republican opposition

denounced the legislation as a "dictator bill," because the increase
of executive employees appeared to be a maneuver by the President to
increase his powers over the other branches.
reorganization had public support:

39

But FDR's plans for

the citizenry wanted the federal

government, and especially the president, to do something.

Congress

thus approved the Brownlow committee report.
Two years following the enactment of Brownlow, Congress and FDR
passed the Reorganization Act of 1939.*®

This measure gave the

president additional authority to submit plans for the reorganization of
the executive branch— subject to congressional veto.

The Act also
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created the "executive office of the president" and expanded FDR's
role as the chief manager of the White H o u s e . T h e Act of 1939 thus
further centralized control in the Oval Office and increased the number
of people reporting directly to the president. By Roosevelt's third term
Vftiite House advisors assumed many of the roles previously the sole
domain of the departments.
Despite some Republican opposition to Roosevelt's ambitious
restructuring programs, the President was able to organize his VJliite
House without much opposition from the majority of Congress.

As Garry

Wills contends, Roosevelt was able to get much of what he wanted
precisely because he became responsive to the public's wishes for a more
proactive p r e s i d e n t . H e understood the new expectations on the
government and grasped the public's desire that he articulate their
wishes to Capitol Hill.
sick nation.

Wills states that:

"Roosevelt ministered to a

Economic cures were being proposed on all sides, and

Roosevelt was ready to try any of them."

43

Wills's statement captures

the main reason behind the increased responsibilities and staff size of
the executive branch.

More staffers were needed to help the

administration communicate with legislators on complicated pieces of
legislation.
To increase his chances of getting his initiatives passed through
Congress, the president employed White House liaisons to keep the lines
of communication open between the White House and C o n g r e s s . T h e
liaisons kept him aware of congressional activities that might help or
hurt the administration by reporting to him what congressional members
were saying and doing on the Hill.
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In light of these new executive responsibilities, FDR changed the
function of government.

By the time Dwight Eisenhower was elected, the

White House staff was a fixture of the executive.
The Eisenhower Administration

President Eisenhower had a clear idea of how he wanted to improve
White House operations.

Pundits of the time described Eisenhower as

having a "strong sense of order and a readiness to delegate.
Drawing on his vast military experience, Eisenhower believed the tfhite
House staff would function smoothly if a military concept of order and
organization was instituted.

Eisenhower thought that "organization

cannot make a genius out of an incompetent; even less can it, of itself,
make the decisions which are required to trigger necessary action.

On

the other hand, disorganization can scarcely fail to result in
inefficiency and can easily lead to disaster.

Eisenhower

instituting a chief of staff system where one man would carry the
responsibility of supervising all other a i d e s . T h i s attempt to create
a more efficient executive office was not the sole reason for
Eisenhower's legislative success.
Eisenhower made sure that his staff appointments were experienced
Washington insiders.

He asserted that by hiring those who knew how

Washington worked his administration would be more successful in
lobbying congressional members.

President Eisenhower was the first to

appoint an experienced full-time congressional liaison to the newly
created Office of Congressional Relations (OCR).

He argued that having

an appointment who could relate to legislators would link the White
House and Congress in a congenial relationship.

The OCR thus began to
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field immediately requests from legislators on appointments and
patronage.

Eisenhower's actions sent the legislators a message that he

wanted to work with the legislature.

Had he opted for an appointment

unknown to the members on the Hill, the bargaining relationship with
Congress would have been complicated.

The liaison's experience meant

the administration would spend little time learning how to affect
legislation and work with individual legislators.

48

Eisenhower initially believed in limited government and v;anted to
return the White House staff to its pre-World War Two size.

He thought

that he could get by with just a personal secretary, a chief of staff,
and a few general assistants.

But almost immediately upon taking office

he faced more of a workload than he expected and reversed his plans to
decrease staff size.

With the rise in stature of the VThite House staff,

the cabinet continued its decline in influencing the president.

Since a

large staff system increased the chances of mistakes. Eisenhower
announced all decisions in front of the department heads and head
staffers to ensure that both the staff and the departments knew what was
expected of them and what goals the administration would pursue.

He had

his Chief of Staff follow up on these decisions to remind the cabinet of
the positions taken by the president.

The staff also reminded the

department heads to implement the president's decisions.

In this way,

Eisenhower assured that everyone in the administration, including the
OCR, focused on the same goals.
Eisenhower's system allowed cabinet officers to run their daily
operations without much presidential interference.

He wanted the

departments and staff offices to take care of most of the problems while
he concentrated on larger issues.

When cabinet members and staffers
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disagreed among themselves, they were to see the Chief of Staff, Sherman
Adams.

Adams mediated differences, and his decisions were final.

Adams's presence and powerful position in the White House provoked many
4*^
in the administration to nickname him "the governor." '

Eisenhower

saw his Chief of Staff as his "son of a bitch" since it was Adams's
job to guarantee that the administration ran smoothly.^®
served directly under Adams noted his imperious style.

Those who
One staffer,

Robert Gray, recalled that during some meetings with Adams he was
"afraid to inhale for fear of breathing fire. "

51

Sherman also chaired

all staff meetings where he would lecture those in attendance about the
most minute details concerning the direction of the administration.
None challenged his orders because the relationship he had with the
president was clearly beyond question.

The staff system under

Eisenhower removed many of the President's burdens thus allowing him to
concentrate on larger issues like his proposals.

Lyndon Johnson and the Growth of the OCR

The most efficient and successful use of the OCR came from
President Lyndon Johnson's organizational style.

He had the OCR gather

information on many legislators, not just on their voting records, but
also on their politics and the political pressures on them from their
districts and states.

The OCR reported directly to LBJ.

He also made

sure that the liaison office kept him current on any activity and all
legislation making its way through the Congress.

One OCR staffer,

Claude Desautels, stated that;
Lyndon Johnson was a kind of generator of interest, and he was
thorough in his knowledge of legislation, and so interested in
even the smallest piece of legislation. As long as it was on that
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'must' [priority] list, he wanted you to go out and win it. He'd
go over the list with you and say, 'Well what are we doing about
this? Where are we here, and where are we there? VThat are we
doing?' As a consequence, you'd sometimes get 60, 70, 80. bills
on that list and he knew exactly where they were...knew them all,
and he'd follow them.

Johnson kept up with the bills pending on the Hill by installing direct
phone lines between the Oval Office and the OCR.

By pressing a button

on the phone with a liaison's name on it, Johnson could reach the
staffer and inquire about a piece of legislation that the liaison
followed.

The OCR, however, went beyond mere lobbying on Capitol Hill

and informing the President on the status of bills.
Johnson made sure that the OCR rewarded legislators who backed his
proposals.

He reasoned that those compensated for their support would

be more likely to vote for White House initiatives in the future.

The

OCR also made sure to reward the administration's most ardent and loyal
supporters so as to not give them the impression that Johnson took their
support for granted.

The compensations took a variety of forms.

For

example, one loyal Johnson supporter and member of the House Public
Works Committee, Fats Everett (D-TN), wanted a warden employed by the
Fish and Wildlife service removed, but the Department of the Interior
was intransigent.

Henry Wilson of the OCR took up Everett's problem and

wrote to Oren Beatty, the Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior.
The warden was then fired.

Everett appreciated the administration's

work and expressed his willingness to assist the President when he
wanted a bill passed.
Legislators also received government programs and projects for
their state.

Representative Carl D. Perkins (D-KY), who supported the

Great Society programs and most specifically the Economic Opportunity
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Bill, received sixteen million dollars worth of projects for his
district— six million dollars above the quota provisionally allotted to
him. 5"*
However, if legislators could not support the VJhite House, the
President did not indiscriminately punish them.

The OCR took into

account the politics of the congressperson's district on difficult
votes.

If the voters of a particular district did not like a piece of

legislation, Johnson could not realistically expect a Congress member to
vote with the administration.

Generally, though, the OCR knew which

votes would be difficult and tried to include those members whose votes
were needed to make the bill more attractive in the negotiating process.

The Nixon Administration;

Questioning Presidential and Staff Power

As vice-president. Richard Nixon had become impressed with
Eisenhower's staff system.

He recruited two former Eisenhower aides,

Bryce Harlow and Andrew Goodpaster, to help him put his staff together.
He asked Harlow to help because of his success in the Congressional
Liaison's Office.

The decision to bring Harlow to Washington

illustrates Nixon's belief in the importance of White House
organization.

It also demonstrated that Nixon was a management

conscious president who was concerned about the way the White House
functioned.

The President-elect and his Chief of Staff, Bob Haldeman,

began to focus on White House structure and procedures weeks prior to
the election.

55

Haldeman spent many hours preparing for his job by

reading books about staff management.

Additionally, just after the
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election, the President-elect flew to Florida with a few staffers to
relax and prepare for taking office.
Initially, Nixon did not think he would concentrate as much power
in the Chief of Staff as he eventually did.

Nixon believed that Adams

had too much power in the Eisenhower administration.
more accessible to his top staffers.

He wanted to be

But Nixon soon scrapped this

organizational plan, realizing that his time was valuable and he needed
someone to guard the Oval Office door and limit access to him.
Haldeman also made sure Nixon's decisions were carried out.

He

explained that every administration has to have a clear cut
organizational structure so as to move constantly the administration
toward its goals.

He insisted on a "zero defects" operation where

everything the President wanted would be carried out flawlessly.

57

In

this way he was very much like Sherman Adams, who eventually made
enemies within the staff structure.
because of this zealotry.

Haldeman created animosities

With his German name and crew cut hair style,

some inside the White House labeled him "the Nazi."^®
rationalized these descriptions of him:

Haldeman

''Every President needs a son-

of-a-bitch, and I'm Nixon's.

I'm his buffer, and I'm his bastard.
I
CQ
get done what he wants done and I take the heat instead of him.''
Clearly, Nixon knew how he wanted to get things accomplished.

But he

became too detached from the legislative process and he took a combative
approach to Congress.

Furthermore, he relied too heavily on Haldeman

without supervising what his staff chief was accomplishing in his name.
Nixon thought that Washington had three demons that must be
confronted:

the press. Congress, and the federal bureaucracy.^®

most intense opposition was directed at the legislature.
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using his liaison staff to bargain with Congress, he unprecedently
impounded funds the Hill appropriated to programs he did not like.

He

thus tried to use administrative actions instead of engaging in the
legislative process.

For example, in the Fall of 1972 Nixon vetoed the

Water Pollution Control Act that provided eleven billion in
appropriations in 1973 and 1974 for building water pollution plants.
Congress overrode his veto.

But Nixon was so intent on stopping this

legislation he impounded the funds appropriated anyway.

62

Since this

approach offended many members of Congress, it rendered his use of the
OCR generally ineffective.
In 1969 Nixon sent to the Hill the Family Assistance Plan (FAP)
which was a welfare reform package guaranteeing families in America a
minimum income.

The plan emphasized workfare over welfare and had broad

bi-partisan support.

The President announced that FAP was his "high

domestic priority," but his administration's lack of enthusiasm in
lobbying for its passage made many question whether he really supported
the initiative.

63

For two months after the details reached Congress,

the White House, and the OCR, fell silent on the issue, and Congress
responded coolly to the plan.

When it became evident that the plan

would not even make it out of the House Ways and Means Committee, Nixon
began to lobby the House membership intensely.

He even temporarily

organized a liaison team whose sole job was to promote FAP.

The

administration's efforts paid off, and on March 5. 1970, the House
approved the FAP proposal.

However, after this victory, the

administration ran into more problems in the Senate.
Both liberal and conservative Senators found something wrong with
FAP, but the Nixon administration once again fell silent on the proposal
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because they believed that the House vote signaled smooth sailing for
the Senate’s consideration of the plan.

However, because Nixon and his

staff did not communicate with Congress, the White House was not aware
of the problems many legislators had with FAP.

The department head of

the Urban Affairs Council. Daniel Moynihan. stated that the
administration "was not sufficiently aware of the danger...the
altogether different mood of the Senate Committee [from Ways and Means]
was not sensed."
Two days after the Senate Finance Committee began hearings, members
of the committee voted against the bill, surprising the administration.
Though staffers and department heads immediately began working on a
compromise proposal, Nixon's continued reticence over the initiative did
not send legislators the message that the President really wanted to
pass the bill.

Even the OCR was left out of the planning process.

Five

weeks after the Senate Finance Committee killed FAP, Nixon decided to
reenter the debate.

He personally called Senators and invited them to

the White House for dinners.
However, these personal appeals did not have much effect on the
Senate.

On October 8, 1970, the Senate Finance Committee voted FAP down

fourteen to one.

All six Republicans voted against the bill.

summed up their perception of Nixon and FAP:
of the time, taut not that much."^^

Many

" H e wanted the bill, most

Senator Albert Gore stated that he

did "not have the faintest indication as to the President's lobbying
efforts to get the Family Assistance Plan through Congress in 1970."^"^
The difficulties of achieving FAP prompted Nixon to restructure the
executive office.
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In response to the administration's organizational problems Nixon
became dissatisfied M±th the powerful Chief of Staff system.

To make

sure his subordinates kept their eye on the administration's goals,
Nixon created a "counter-bureaucracy" within the White House to keep
track of those he h i r e d . N i x o n concluded that the vast bureaucracy,
specifically in the departments, kept him from getting things
accomplished.

Presidential aide John Ehrlichman echoed this sentiment

when he said that " w e only see them [department secretaries and
employees] at the annual White House Christmas party; they go off and
marry the natives.

In other words, those who worked for the

departments did not pursue the interests of the administration, but
rather those outside the administration.
The drawback of the counter bureaucracy was that Nixon created an
entity that competed for the loyalty of the President.^®

Some believe

that the creation of this extra staff body precipitated the Watergate
scandal.

The White House staff grew to more than 4000 employees.

71

After the 1972 election, Nixon realized the error of creating a vast
executive staff.
appointees.

He announced that he had lost confidence in his

He believed that the White House staff must decrease in

size so he could more formally control them.

Nixon may have displayed

such urgency over staff size to deflect growing concern over Watergate.
But some have concluded that the scandal began, initially, by those
around Nixon;
on its own.

a large and uncontrollable counterbureucracy had gone off

7?
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Conclusion:

The Consequences of Expanding Staff

The consequence of the Nixon administration's problems with
Watergate provoked more intense studies on White House structure and
organization.

Nixon's experience, and the possible detrimental

implications for the country, compels one to consider seriously how a
staff should be organized to help the president with the legislation he
wants passed.
By the end of President Johnson's administration, the number of
policies emanating from the White House increased dramatically.

73

Congress and the public expected a broader legislative domestic agenda
from the president.

Johnson reinforced these expectations by convincing

the public that government could relieve such problems as poverty.

As a

result, greater demands were made on the White House for policy
coordination.

Johnson's remedy for the poor was encapsulated in his

Great Society initiatives.

Without a liaison staff bargaining with

legislators on his behalf, Johnson would have found himself overwhelmed.
Johnson thus continued what FDR started in 1934:

the use of staff to

meet rising expectations from the public that more must be accomplished
on the executive level.

Still, Eisenhower articulated some possible

drawbacks of the staff system.
Even though Eisenhower revolutionized the way presidents organized
staff, the staff has potentially become a way for presidents to avoid
accountability.

For example, Eisenhower Press Secretary James Hagerty

noted that the President created a buffer zone between himself and the
public and press.

As Hagerty stated,

"he would say 'do it this way'

and I would say 'if I go to that press conference and say what you want
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me to say, I would get hell.''
me.

74

Eisenhower replied "better you than

In this way, Hamilton's admonition in Federalist Paper Seventy

regarding the staff providing political cover from criticism has been
ignored.

Still, many hold the president responsible for any problems

with the White House staff because he is the person who organizes and
manages his subordinates.
Vîhile FDR was pivotal in creating this opportunity for presidential
expansion and control over the White House staff, Eisenhower set the
standard of managing those who would fill the expanding executive
positions.

While the Brownlow Committee intended to limit the powers

and responsibilities of staffers, presidents have found this aim
unreasonable because it makes it difficult for the President to meet all
76
his demands.

Some scholars have suggested that the Brownlow

committee's recommendations have proven to be a double-edged sword for
the president.
control,

On the one hand, a large scale staff is difficult to

weakening the presidency and the ability of chief executives

to effect change.

On the other hand, the growth allows the president to

concentrate on more important things while enlisting support for
legislative programs.

77

Both assertions have merit.

FDR and Eisenhower

used their staff systems to their advantage with minor negative
repercussions.

However, as the Nixon example demonstrates, some chief

executives are not as adroit in managing their staff.
Many of Nixon's problems, regardless of his hostility towards
Congress, emanated from his detachment from the legislative process.
Nixon remained distant from his OCR staff, and they had little input
into the policy process (as evidenced in the FAP p r o p o s a l ) . T o make
matters worse. Congress did not take the OCR seriously because they
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perceived the liaisons as not being able to speak on behalf of the
-?g

President.

This perception was reinforced as Nixon did not

communicate with them on a regular basis.

Further, there is no evidence

that Nixon had Haldeman relay important instructions to the OCR staff.
Indeed, he rarely saw most of his personal staff a d v i s o r s . N i x o n ' s
unwillingness to communicate with his subordinates fostered an
environment which lacked discipline and cohesion.
looked disorganized.

The Vfhite House thus

81

The counter bureaucracy he established in the attempt to take
control of the Vrtiite House did not provide the control he was looking
QO
for. "

Ironically, despite Nixon's desire for isolation, he was very

concerned with the details of things other than the management of his
administration.

For example, he wanted to choose the White House

furniture himself, and he wanted extensive memos on v;hat wines were
offered and served at White House functions.

In this sense, Nixon

spent too much time on unimportant details of the White House when he
should have been managing and articulating his goals to his staff.
Though President Carter did not organize his White House in the same way
as Nixon, they had similar organizational styles.

Like Nixon, Carter

did not seek to organize and communicate with his staff.
had a penchant for details.

Carter also

These similarities spawned similar problems

for the Carter presidency.
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CHAPTER 3
CARTER AND HIS STATF

The election of Jimmy Carter surprised many due to his political
anonymity.^

This relative obscurity lead many to rule him out as a

contender early in the campaign.

However, the disastrous effects of

Watergate prompted the country to want change.

In response to the

public's negative reaction to the Watergate scandal. Carter sought to
distance himself from the Nixon legacy.

He campaigned as an outsider

and promised to curb the excesses of Nixon's "imperial" presidency.^
Since Watergate focused public attention on the potential power of staff
to do illegal things on behalf of the president. Carter instituted a
more decentralized and inclusive White House staff system.
that there would be

He promised

"no all powerful palace guards in my White House,

no anonymous aides, unelected, unknown to the public, and unconfirmed by
the Senate, wielding vast power from the White House basement."
According to Carter's Press Secretary. Jody Powell:

3

"the

Watergate scandal had a significant impact on the type of structure
Carter chose to implement in his White House... there was a sense of
concern about having an excessively powerful White House staff in
general and a Chief of Staff in particular."^

He wanted to avoid the

powerful Chief of Staff system that existed under Haldeman because he
believed that it would cripple the effectiveness and success of his
administration by increasing the chances that staff would become
involved in illegal activities.

To allay such fears, and to increase

his own success. Carter eliminated the chief of staff position.
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President believed he could conduct both his presidential duties and
those of the chief of staff.
Carter reasoned that without a staff chief, more information would
flow into the Oval Office resulting in a president better informed about
the activities within the VThite House.

The chief executive, therefore,

could stop anything antithetical to the administration's goals. The
President thought that without powerful figures like Sherman Adams and
H.R. Haldeman, covert activities would cease.
Believing that a powerful White House staff would choke off the
flow of information to the President, Carter insisted that all option or
opinion papers, except for highly sensitive security issues, should
"make the loop" so all advisors could review the material before a
decision was made.

To keep up with the massive amount of paper flow

into the Oval Office, Carter and some staffers enrolled in a speed
reading course.
While the advisors and staffers were impressed with Carter's
command and knowledge of the issues— especially his attention to
detail— many thought that this system consumed too much time.

Zbigniew

Brzezinski, Assistant for National Security Affairs, concluded that the
amount of time Carter spent reading stemmed from information overload.
As a result. Brzezinski made an attempt to prevent his office from
forwarding too much to the Oval

Office:

At first I would send him a great deal with a cover memo
saying 'please look at the introduction, look at the
conclusion, look at the clipped pages. Here is my analysis.
Here are the other points of view. You have some options.'
And the whole thing would come back to me annotated from
beginning to end. He would read the whole thing. And so
after awhile I realized if I sent him something, he was
going to read it.
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Brzezinski found that 300 pages a day reached Carter from the National
Security office.

In response, Brzezinski actively sought to limit the

amount of material heading to the Oval Office.^

Despite Brzezinski's

forethought, the president still received an extensive amount of reading
material.

Ominous Beginnings;

Carter's Commitment to Decentralization

Some members of the president-elect's administration were concerned
about Carter's organizational intentions.

Joseph Califano. an

experienced politician and Carter's Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare, noted that "the new president evinced little sense of what
Washington was like or of the complexities of governing."^

Califano's

statement foreshadowed an event that occurred soon after the election.
After the inaugural ceremonies, the President's immediate staff met in
the Roosevelt Room in the White House to organize and set priorities.
They were jubilant, but soon became uneasy as no one knew what to do or
who might take charge.

Eventually Frank Moore, who would become the

Assistant Congressional Liaison, turned to Carter's personal advisor,
Hamilton Jordan, smd said ''Ham, what do we do now?
O
got no answer.''

Moore's question

Before the election Moore talked with several presidential experts
and past advisors and developed a transition and organizational plan.
However, Jordan blocked the plan, thinking it unnecessary.

Instead of

spending time formulating a staff hierarchy. Carter announced that he
would institute a "Cabinet Governments"

No White House staff would
9
dominate or act superior to the department secretaries.
The
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secretaries were granted mere authority on policy issues.

Jordan

asserted that many past presidents were confronted with unnecessary
problems when relying too heavily on staff.

He reasoned that staffers

could not accomplish everything from the White House.

Carter argued

that it made perfect sense to spread responsibility to as many as
possible so no one organizational structure would become overburdened.
Still, while Carter wanted to utilize the departments more than his
predecessors, he also wanted to make all the decisions from the Oval
Office.

Carter insisted on being immediately available to almost all

significant personnel in his administration, including department heads
and a few staffers inside the White House.
Despite the staff's access. Carter wanted the cabinet to be the
focal point in helping develop policy eind implement the administration's
programs without the assistance of the executive staff.

To accomplish

this, he spent more time in meetings with his secretaries than with the
vrhite House staff.
memoranda.

11

Initially, he communicated with the staff through

The Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy, Stuart

Eizenstat, became frustrated with this style:
Frequently, though not always, I would suggest that if there
was a particular important...or divisive issue, those
memoranda [should] be followed up by meetings with the
principals in which I would participate. But more often
than not, the president liked to make decisions from paper
and I would get back...his handwritten comments.

The organization Carter instituted looked like a "spokes of the
wheel" system where he represented the hub of the wheel and several
subordinates, representing the spokes of the wheel, would have direct
access to the hub (see appendix A).

As a result, he spent a good deal
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of time settling issues that could have been taken care of at a lower
level.
According to Brzezinski, Carter did not like to delegate "nonpresidential stuff."

14

Hans Mark, Secretary of the Air Force, suggests

that the President's military background was the central reason for his
attention to such detail:

Carter served on a nuclear submarine, where

all must have an acute attention to detail.

Stuart Eizenstat, the

Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy, said:

"h e wasn't satisfied

making a decision unless he felt he really knew the facts about it.

In

that respect, I think he demanded more material than other presidents
might.''

15

Some, like the Assistant for the Public Liaison, Ann Wexler,

defended Carter's style:

" I f you're really going to make decisions,

and when the buck really stops at your desk, you better...know what the
intricacies of that decision really are.

White House Structure;

And he did."^^

Consequences of Carter's Management Style

Since Carter put almost all of his energy into knowing the minute
details of his policies and inner workings of the V/hite House, he did
not focus on the big picture and he did not articulate the most
important goals of the administration.

In other words. Carter did not

convey the broad goals of his administration.

He did not consider it

part of his job to relay his overall vision to the rest of the
administration.

17

The "spokes system" promoted an organization

without a sense of priorities.

Consequently, his staffers could not

pursue a definite agenda on behalf of the administration because there
were several proposals being considered on one topic.

The White House
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Staff did not knov; how to function in their positions because they
lacked direction.

A case in point concerned the Domestic Policy Staff.

Staffers spent most of their time trying to discern what the President
w a n t e d . I n frustration, the staff amassed a list called "promises,
promises" which listed all of Carter's campaign promises so the staff
could work toward some of the goals he stated to the public.

19

The list

did not serve the administration well because several staffers ended up
working on different promises at the same time.

The staff, not

organized to work toward just a few goals, failed to accomplish much
because they could not decipher which issues were most important.

The

decreased significance of the vniite House staff further complicated the
administration's problems by granting the Cabinet more control over
policy formation and advocation.
Carter believed that the Cabinet should take on duties formerly
belonging to the White House staff in the area of creating and lobbying
for proposals.

President Carter's new organizational system, however,

led not only to poor coordination, poor implementation, and bickering
between the departments and the White House staff, but also to
disloyalty on the part of several key cabinet officials.^®

He allowed

the secretaries to appoint their own subordinates and thought that the
department secretaries should create and build their own management
teams.

21

Cabinet members were elated by this decision, but staffers objected
because they thought it infringed on their duties of overseeing and
coordinating the administration.

Departments naturally compartmentalize

into closely guarded areas of authority, and each cabinet office wants
to have sole domain over a specific area like commerce or labor.
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other department or staff office is allowed entry into another without
expressed permission.^

However, departmental proposals often affect

more than one narrow area.

Part of the staff's job includes resolution

of conflicts emerging from departmental turf struggles.

Giving the

cabinet secretaries more authority fostered a mistrust between the staff
and cabinet.

In allowing the departments to set their own policy

priorities without White House interference, the President gave up a
significant amount of policy making authority.
Departments were permitted policy development leeway without VThite
House knowledge or coordination over proposals.

Vfhile Carter spent so

much time working through the details of V/hite House initiatives,
departments formulated and proposed their own measures.

Thus, the

administration ended up advancing several conflicting policy programs.

24

During the Spring of 1978, the Cabinet continued to make announcements
contrary to White House policy.

For example, the Secretary of

Agriculture announced a bigger increase in price supports for grain than
the White House determined necessary.

In another incident, the

Secretary of the Treasury, Ted Blumenthal, denied the possibility of tax
reform at the same time that the White House planned a reform package.
He also publicly contradicted the policy statements of the presidential
economic advisors.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development

criticized Carter's monetary policy and decided to draw up plans for
programs that far surpassed the President's more conservative budget.
Since the White House did not actively partake in, or direct,
policy formation, the secretaries could not resolve conflicts when they
arose.

The problem emanated from the fact that no one cabinet agency

fit neatly into one policy area.

For example, a president cannot direct
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one department to solve the trade deficit problem because that agency
would cross many jurisdictional lines:
Treasury, Energy, and the CIA.

25

Labor, Transportation, Defense,

Carter could not take the time to

solve conflicts that surfaced between departments because he did not
have time.

Thus, he could not make sure the secretaries forwarded

initiatives that agreed with VJhite House proposals.

Some scholars argue

that as a result of Carter's limited time, the department heads took
liberty to act as if their organizations were "personal fiefdoms."^^
They forged ahead with their personal proposals without any regard for
what other departments might be planning or advancing.
Hamilton Jordan commented that the departments ''were independent
of one another and thus oblivious to the political relationships of
their programs."

27

He noted in a memo to Carter that "we have a major

problem in the coordination of goals and objectives of your
administration."

28

All departments considered themselves equal in

importance and would not yield to the other; they jockeyed for position
over turf rather than working together.
both sides were incomprehensible.

29

Policies written to accommodate

However, even if they did work

together, they had " n o clear sense of where the president was leading"
the administration.^®

The lack of direction from the administration

provoked several concerned memos addressed to the President.

For

example, Hamilton Jordan wrote:
We should develop a system for identifying goals and
objectives of this administration. We should translate
those goals and objectives into specific tasks and assign
each task to a responsible person with a work plan and a
timetable. Finally, we should develop a system for
monitoring progress and problems. We should also develop a
system for scheduling the major activities of the President
and Vice-President that reconciles their limited time with
the priority activities of the Administration.
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A.D. Frazier, a staffer on the Chief Executive Reorganization Project,
wrote that the VJhite House staff needed either a chief of staff or some
kind of staff coordinator,

Frazier thought that a coordinator could

provide the President with a plan for dealing with issues in a timely
manner and ensure implementation of those decisions.

But Carter made it

clear that his administration did not need either position.
Two months after the Frazier memo, eleven months after the
inauguration, Eizenstat wrote Carter expressing his concern about the
lack of coordination:
There is no mechanism by which, on a regular basis, we can
find what the other is doing that may have impact on an area
in which we are working...no one has been given the
directive to sift out the various priorities of our work, to
coordinate our work and make sure it is all going in the
same direction, before it all pours in to you.

Soon after the Eizenstat memo, the White House staff tried to convince
the President that government business had become too complex to leave
in the disparate hands of the departments.

Jack Watson, the Assistant

for Cabinet and Intergovernmental Affairs, originally supported Carter's
commitment to cabinet government.

However, he eventually criticized the

"spokes of the wheel" structure because the administration lacked
c o h e s i o n . W a t s o n began to advocate a more hierarchical staff system
to rein in the unruly department secretaries.
The most vocal department head was Health, Education, and Welfare
Secretary Joseph Califano.

He decided to offer a plan banning smoking

in all public places, but he forwarded this proposal to Congress without
discussing it with the White House.

Califano reasoned that Carter would

approve of the announcement because the President stated during the
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campaign that he wanted to develop preventive health care policies.
However, Carter did not know Califano proposed the ban until the
congressional delegation from North Carolina— representing the nation's
largest tobacco industry— notified him of the proposal.
In response to the continual coordination problems between the
White House and the cabinet, in 1978 Carter limited the power of the
departments by requiring all domestic proposals to go through Eizenstat
for approval.

Additionally, all international proposals were to be

filtered through Zbigniew Brzezinski.
monitor the departments.

Hamilton Jordan also began to

Some secretaries responded by becoming even

more vocal and rebellious.

Califano publicly criticized the White House

for being behind the curve on everything.
of the Department of Education;
Viîhite House on tax policies.

He also opposed the creation

Blumenthal continued to differ with the

Echoing Califano's complaint, Blumenthal

said the he v;as ''sick and tired of seeing the president and
administration two and three and four months behind the curve on
everything.

He added that Carter's "presidency [was] looking so

foolish, being dragged hind tail by events."
Generally, the cabinet believed that the problems with the
administration were the result of the White House staff who leaked
negative information to the press.

They also blamed the staff for

seldomly returning departmental calls.

OO

The problems between the

cabinet and staff originated from the organizational structure set up by
Carter.

Part of these problems were allayed when Carter gave the

Domestic Policy Staff more control under Stuart Eizenstat.
When Carter granted them more authority and appointed Stu Eizenstat
as the Assistant for Domestic Policy, they became increasingly
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organized.

Eizenstat immediately disbanded the Domestic Council, formed

the Domestic Policy Staff Office, and hired twenty-five experienced
professional Washington insiders who had the ability to influence
Congress.

They advised Eizenstat on proposals under development in the

departments.
The Domestic Policy Staff also established policy objectives and
then invited relevant agencies and departments to submit memoranda which
would then be summarized in short memos to Carter.

These memos

contained yes/no boxes for Carter to check so he could relate which
ideas he supported.

The inclusion of the policy staff improved

communication and increased the administration's cohesion.

However,

while they had more authority. Carter insisted on keeping them on a
short leash— not granting them the authority necessary to do their job.
The staff still did not have power to coordinate domestic policy over
the cabinet.
The inability of the Domestic Policy Staff to work to its fullest
capacity inhibited them from settling many disputes among agencies,
departments, and staffers.

39

Eizenstat did have some success in

mediating a conflict between the Energy Department and the Treasury
Department.

The Energy Department wanted a twenty percent tax credit

instituted for those citizens who installed solar energy equipment to
help heat their homes.

Conversely, the Treasury Department wanted to

limit the same tax credit to ten percent.

Seemingly at an impasse,

Eizenstadt forced a compromise by splitting the difference to a fifteen
percent credit.^®

In reality, however, the secretaries still retained

much of their influence over their departments and the proposals that
emanated from them.
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Several scholars have taken a second look at the Carter
administration's insistence on pursuing a cabinet government.

They

conclude that he was naive about the effects of the
decentralized/spokes-of-the-v/heel organizational structure.

For

instance, when Carter called cabinet meetings, he would ask his
secretaries about several different issues and expect all of them to be
as informed as he was on the issues in question.

Instead, the

departments wanted to focus on area effecting their oim interests.

If

an issue crossed departmental lines, as frequently occurred, all
agencies in question wanted to have a say in the policy.

Without a

centralized staff to enforce decisions, the departments continued to
pursue their own agendas.

Frustrated by the difficulty of getting his

executive house in order. Carter's weekly cabinet meetings became
informational rather than decision-making sessions.
Carter's initial vision of cabinet government lasted only six
months.

Jordan slowly restricted access to the President, and Eizenstat

increased the prominence of the executive staff.

Major policy

initiatives, like energy and welfare reform, were filtered through the
"Georgia M a f i a " — those Georgians whom Carter appointed as VJhite House
advisors upon taking office.

After discussing the issues with his

staffers. Carter would retreat to the oval office, alone, to make a
decision.

Some suggest that this isolation guaranteed failure*.

"He

did not work 'with those who have spent their careers coming to know
what can be done' or 'what the people will accept. '

Consequently,

when he and his advisors did meet, they rarely disagreed with him since
Carter discouraged forcing problems into the open for debate.
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Carter was an extremely intelligent President, possibly the most
intelligent one in the modern era.

His acumen prompted him to expect

others to know the issues thoroughly before speaking.

This attitude

intimidated staffers and quelled honest and open discussions about the
issues.

One White House aide recalled a time when Carter asked all

those in a meeting what the administration should do concerning an
issue.

Vrhen this aide began speaking. Carter interrupted him and

ridiculed his opinion.

45

Thus, Carter lacked the capability to force

disagreements out into the open.
Even though several staffers and advisors in the White House wanted
to discuss the mistakes they believed their President made, they did not
speak up for fear of losing their position and Carter's respect.

The

advisors rarely disagreed in meetings or in other open atmospheres.
Carter promoted this fear whether he knew it or not, and thus deprived
himself of valuable information.^^

Carter once berated Secretary of

State Cyrus Vance for disagreeing with the President's foreign policy
objectives.

An angry Carter "l it into Vance" and accused him of

leaking embarrassing information about the administration to the
p r e s s . C a r t e r further told Vance that "if this goes on, I will make
my decisions only with Fritz [Mondale] and Zbig [Brzezinski] and simply
not tell anybody else.''^^

VAien Vance continued to oppose the

President's Iranian foreign policy, he was excluded from the rescue
mission of the Americaui hostages.
Despite Carter's warning, Vance opposed the rescue mission because
he believed it was "poorly conceived" and "difficult to execute."

49

When Vance decided to take his long planned vacation in Florida. Carter
called a meeting of his top foreign policy advisors who favored the
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rescue attempt.

A stunned Vance became angry that the administration

made such a monumental decision in his absence.

Inevitably, Vance

resigned because he believed that he had no latitude to do his job
properly.
The White House Staff Begins to Speak Up

Since the atmosphere within the White House appeared hostile to
dissent, advisors and staffers failed to discuss difficult questions.
Carter's beliefs remained unchallenged, and he was unaware of his policy
problems.

No rigorous evaluation of policy existed— especially in the

first

year of thepresidency.

Jordan echoed his concern at lack of

White

House debate in a memo he wrote to Carter:
I have been concerned that you and all of us talk too much
to one another and don't have the benefit of different
points of view that challenge some of the basic premises on
which our decisions are made. I think the real challenge is
to assemble a small group of people that you trust and are
comfortable with and have collective experience to provide
you with advice on...issues.

Jordan suggested a more open dialogue and a request to centralize the
executive by giving the staff more authority.

Despite Jordan's urging,

some suggest that Carter had faith only in himself and not the staff.

*51

But a collegial, or spokes-of-the-wheel, system that promotes a
decentralized system, requires input from all offices and departments
invited to the decision-making table.
Furthermore, collegial systems cannot organize policy analysis or
encourage policy development without direction from the Oval Office.
many ways, the collegial system demands more time from the president
because of the many staffers and aides who have direct access to him.
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Because Carter was "dov/n in the weeds...[and] did not have a global
view of what he wanted" the White House personnel were beleaguered on
two different levels.

They could not argue against Carter substantively

on the issues because his knowledge created the atmosphere that any
staffer or cabinet member who spoke up looked ignorant. "

Additionally,

both the staff and the cabinet did not know specifically how they should
go about achieving all that Carter wanted.
This organizational and implementation dilemma serves as an example
of the complexity and controversy within the Wliite House.

Paul C.

Light, a presidential scholar, believes that the decision making process
eventually spanned many offices and departments, and thus decisions took
several weeks to complete.

53

The problem with having so many people

involved in the decision process is that what may begin as a bold and
clear initiative in the beginning becomes unrecognizable and hard to
understand in the end, frustrating and alienating the staff.
The Assistant for Cabinet and Intergovernmental Affairs, Jack
Watson, echoed these problems encountered in the early part of the
administration;
In 1977, when we came in, there were simply too many
initiatives of too high a level of controversy and
complexity that he wanted to do all at once. Let's pass a
national urban policy. Let's pass a national comprehensive
national energy policy. Let's reorganize the executive
brainch of government, and so on. ..Those were things
involving huge political^^apital expenditures, and we did
too many things at once.

Frank Moore, the Assistant Congressional Liaison, wrote to the
President;

"The consequence of Cabinet Government is that the

administration's programs lack coherence...too often departments pursue
their own interests even if those interests conflict with stated
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administration goals."

55

One White House aide expanded on Moore's

statement by pinpointing the problem emanated in Carter's original
cabinet structure:
All of our problems are aggravated by the so called 'cabinet
government' efforts...But you cam't run the government that way
from 10 department locations.
It is just too difficult to get
government together.
There are so many agencies involved in one
issue. People don't understand that five agencies all going in
different directions create chaos. There needed to be a
coordinating place. There had to be a legislative package
prepared by the administration...It took us most of the year to
figure this out and to begin to iron it out.

James Fallows,

Carter's chief speechwriter, echoed the aide's comment.

He thought the administration wasted the first year in office while
groping for answers and that an administrative coordinator would have
helped.

Without a coordinator. Fallows reasoned that there was no way

of knowing how all the policies generated would relate to one another
once presented to Congress and in what priority.

57

This disorganized approach to staff direction in general affected
the legislative agenda of the administration.

The president determines

how the office runs, and how it is organized and operates.

58

The

question that constantly arises within the White House ''is how to
organize the executive office to ensure presidential priorities are
carried out."

59

Carter's rejection of hierarchy made it difficult to

coordinate and enforce his goals.

The inflow of briefing and reading

material from various secretaries and staffers further took away from
the President's time to coordinate or set priorities.
Carter tried to do more than many presidents, but with a less
orderly hierarchical organization.

Because he wanted to know everything

generated from the administration right down to the finest detail, he
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did not delegate responsibility.

The spokes of the wheel system served

to bog do^vn the decision making process.

The system overwhelmed the

President and thus took away from the effectiveness at setting a clear

. 60
agenda.
The breakdown in the way Carter managed his VJhite House became most
evident in his relationship with the Office of Congressional Relations.
The problems with the White House organization would have detrimental
effects on not only his relationship with the OCR, but also his
relationship with Congress.
effect on his energy bill.

These difficulties would have a detrimental
Before understanding the problems that

Carter faced concerning the OCR, one needs to have knowledge of the
formal structure and duties of the OCR.
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Chapter 4

THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS AND THE ENERGY PROPOSAL
Though its duties and responsibilities are wide and varied, the OCR
provides a necessary link between the White House and Capitol Hill.
Once the functions of the office are known, then a glimpse into how
Carter did or did not effectively manage may be understood.

Though the

institution is a m o d e m creation in the Executive Branch, much of the
traditional functions of the office were formed during the 1950s.

Organization and Duties of the Office of Congressional Relations

President Dwight Eisenhower created the OCR, also called the
Legislative Affairs Office, to facilitate relations with Congress.
While subsequent presidents have organized the office differently, the
OCR has four main objectives:

{1} lobbying,

(2) intelligence gathering,

(3) representation, and (4) interdepartmental organization.^

To make

sure these are being carried out requires the constant attention of the
OCR head.

The central function of the liaison office lays with lobbying

Congress to pass the president's initiatives.

In a mutually supporting

way, when liaisons lobby the Hill, they communicate with legislators and
inevitably discover their concerns.

Thus, intelligence gathering

involves the liaison to gather information on the status of the
president's initiatives.

It also includes the liaisons to keep track of

what congressional members are thinking.

Representation combines what

is learned in the prior objectives and the OCR relays information from
the Hill to the president and vice-versa.

In this sense the OCR
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communicates both the legislator's concerns and White House concerns.
Finally, the office should be organized in such a way that the liaisons
knows what their duties are and what committee assignments must be
attended on the Hill.

However, the objectives involve more than just

accomplishing these general responsibilities.
Under the lobbying category, the OCR should know which pieces of
legislation the White House considers most important in order for the
liaisons to prioritize the initiatives for Congress.

Once the

legislature knows what legislation the President deems most important,
they can confront each program in relation to what the Ifhite House
considers most important.

Lobbying also includes responding to

congressional requests for favors, thus fostering a better negotiating
climate for consideration of the president's initiatives.

For example,

some members of Congress might ask the president to appoint one of their
political supporters to an executive post.

The OCR fields these

requests and maintains communication between the legislator and the
chief executive while the appointment process is underway.

This kind of

communication with Capitol Hill also contributes to the OCR's
intelligence gathering responsibility.
Many requests come to the VThite House via the mail.

The

Legislative Affairs Office acknowledges receipt of the mail.
letters are also catalogued for the president.

The

Finally, with the

president's direction, the OCR prepares a response stating the
president's position.

The OCR receives and answers mail coming from

Capitol Hill addressed to most executive offices.

It answers the mail

in coordination with the department or staff office to which the letter
was directed.
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In conjunction with gathering information through the mail, the OCR
also conducts head counts for the president on measures, and assesses
the probability of passage of these measures coming up for a vote.

The

head counts assist the OCR in deciphering what developments on Capitol
Hill might disturb the president's agenda.

For example, when a

representative's constituency does not like the president's programs,
the legislator will most likely not support the White House proposal.
As long as the OCR maintains contact with the Hill, the Vfhite House will
be able to find out what legislators will and will not vote for.

This

information enables the chief executive to bargain with congressional
members and thus produce a bill that the majority of both houses will
accept.
Representation brings together both lobbying and information
gathering responsibilities.

The OCR must not only relate the

president's wishes to Congress, but also express congressional views to
the chief executive.

It is only through this relationship that both

branches may engage in a bargaining relationship.

To represent the

president and congress member effectively requires interdepartmental
organization.
Interdepartmental organization requires the OCR to oversee
individual liaison members to make sure they are performing their
duties:

properly representing the president, attending committee

meetings, relaying all the information certain legislators are feeling.
The fulfillment of these responsibilities requires liaisons to spend
much of their time on the Hill.
The OCR is usually divided into Senate and House groups.

Within

each group, individual staffers are assigned to specific committees
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where they follow the president's initiatives and communicate with
legislators.

This organization helps the office track certain proposals

emanating from the White House.

Staffers find themselves rotated

between committees so as not to wear out their welcome with one
congressman.

Former presidential aide Richard Patterson explains that

the rotation of liaisons occur so the politician does not:
and exclaim 'Oh, it's you again!'"

2

"look up

This rotation keep a legislator

from becoming annoyed at a particular persistant liaison.

Once a

congressional member becomes wearied by a certain staffer, that
liaison's effectiveness in lobbying and gatherming information declines.
If the OCR has its liaison team effectively organized, rotating liaisons
also demonstrates the administration's competence.
The advancement of the president's agenda is the first priority of
the OCR.3

Beginning at 7:00 in the morning the liaisons report for

several rounds of staff meetings.

Afterward they head to Capitol Hill

to lobby congressional members and sit in on committee hearings.

Other

staffers back at the White House many attend cabinet meetings or other
executive sessions.

Their presence is especially valuable for the

administration because they will likely know what proposals will and
will not get through Congress.

Since the liaisons have more contact

with Capitol Hill than most staffers, they know what politicians will
accept and what initiatives will face opposition.
The OCR does not have an office on the Hill, but the individual
staffers usually use the vice-president's Senate office as a
coordinating center while the House group utilizes the various rooms
delegated to congressional leaders as office space.^

There are also

several places inside the Capitol building that are restricted.

The
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House and Senate floors, as well as the cloakrooms, are off limits to
liaisons as well as lobbyists.

However, the space granted to the White

House staffers by Capitol Hill serves as needed coordinating centers
especially when crucial measures come up on the legislative agenda.
The liaisons conduct head counts on these crucial votes "since the
presidential party leaders don't know the opposition's head count and
the opposition leaders won't share it . " ^

These numbers of those who

support the executive are relayed back to the president so he can make
any last minute calls to shore up votes.

If the staff identifies an

undecided member, the liaison tries to get past the politician's staff
and talk to him/her directly.
One Republican White House staffer describes the last-minute
lobbying just before the members go in to vote on legislation;

I would station myself by the door which the Democrats used.
There might be ten to fifteen people lined up on each side
of the entryway— mostly union lobbyists. The congressman
might have a last question before going in, or I could
remind the member that I had come to his or her office
beforehand. Maybe I could convince them to hold their votes
until the very end. At the very least, my standing there
was a signal to them that I was watching the members, that I
cared enough to stand out there and be there. I would go
around later and say a personal thank you for a vote, or
remind them that they had promised me but had backed down.
If they had not shown up, I could ask, "Where were you?"
But standing in that throng was an intimidating experience
[for the legislator]....

This statement demonstrates the positive influence the OCR liaison team
may have in lobbying legislators to vote for the President's proposals
if not in the short teirm, the long term.

The OCR's presence at least

lets members of Congress know that the White House is concerned about
its legislative program.
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As both houses conclude their business for the day, the liaison's
job does not end.

The Congressional Relations Office is located in the

East Wing of the VThite House.

It is here that the lobbyists prepare

briefings and bios of members coming to see the president in the near
future, writing up one-pagers for the presidential phone calls, or
inquiring in the agencies about the status of an issue or project.^
The OCR must also demonstrate to Capitol Hill that their message
receives the full support of the chief executive.

To help the OCR

accomplish its responsibilities, the staff needs to confirm that they
speak on behalf of the president.

For instance, Eisenhower would direct

one of his staffers. General Parsons, to bring congressional members to
the Oval Office.

These meetings with the President bolstered Parsons's

credibility on Capitol Hill because Eisenhower would repeat and confirm
the messages Parsons relayed to Congress.

After these meetings the

legislator would go back to the Hill and say;
" I talked with the
Q
president."
This process confirmed to the legislators that when
Parsons spoke with them, he did so with the President's full support.
In essence, bringing the congressional member to the Oval Office
confirmed Parson's believability to many on the Hill.
To make sure the tactic used by Eisenhower works effectively, the
congressional liaison head must have access to the president so he can
tell a Senator or Representative that he has spoken with the president
about the issue.

This communication may occur in face-to-face meetings

and/or through memoranda.

For example, Frank Moore, the head of the OCR

under Carter, would compile a legislative report for President Carter
who would in turn mark up the report and send it back to Moore with the
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following comments:

"'Make it clear I will veto';
Q
'Move on him, I can help.'"

'Don't push it'; or

In a similar way, before Reagan called on a congressional member,
his staff would prepare "talking points" enclosed in a folder.

10

While speaking, Reagan would scratch notes in the margin's of the memo:
"Send the Senator more information;" Follow up on point 3."^ ^

These

instructions were sent to the legislative liaison's office where the
staffers would act on the president's instructions. In these ways the
congressional liaisons for both Reagan and Carter found it much easier
to advance the president's legislative programs.

12

Communication between the chief liaison and the president fosters
coherency in White House legislative planning.

The president instructs

the OCR when to compromise and when to stand firm on issues.

The

staffer will also know specifically when to pressure the congressional
member who might want favors from the Vïhite House.

For example, a

staffer might pressure a legislator to extract a vote favorable for the
president:

" I f you can't help the president on this vote, that's going

to make it awfully hard for the president to help you on that
appointment" for your friend or political s u p p o r t e r . O n c e the
president has let the OCR know what should be accomplished and how, the
bargaining process functions more smoothly.

Ultimately lobbying

Congress resembles a two-way street between the president and his
staffers and members of Congress— communication decreases
misunderstandings between the two branches.
The ability to bargain with congressional members is an arduous
process.

One of President Kennedy's staffers. Larry O'Brien, noted what

was entailed in the bargaining with Congress:
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It becomes a way of life in which you are engaged in human
relations and constantly working out compromises. You
listen to and solicit support from everybody on the Hill.
You cajole, urge and plead. There's always the hot breath
of opposition; don't resent it, understand it. You have to
appreciate that at times there are those, even among your
friends, who can't go along with you, that there is a line
that they can't cross.
Just remember, there is always
tomorrow.

One can see in O'Brien's statement the frustrating nature of trying to
get others to agrees with the Mhite house.

One Reagan Vniite House aide

commented that inevitable disagreements do not necessarily damage the
future bargaining atmosphere:
We may never agree on an issue, but legislative affairs
people always discuss, even with their opponents, why the
disagreement is there, get their views, and they realize
that while they don't agree on a given question they may
agree on the next issue coming up.

The examples portrayed by O'Brien and the Reagan White House illustrate
how the OCR fulfills its responsibilities with the president's guidance.
With direction, the White House moves one step closer to realizing its
goals,
The OCR was developed as a tool for the White House to build
congressional coalitions for its programs.

Given the growing

independence of the members of the legislature and the increased White
House participation in initiating legislation, the OCR provides the
necessary bridge between the two branches.

Seen in this light, the OCR

requires White House coordination so that the staff office knows how to
best serve the president in his efforts to pass his agenda.

Above all,

the president must inform the OCR on which legislation the White House
deems most important and instruct them to lobby Congress accordingly.
Yet this complicated process concerning the organization of the White
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House and management of the OCR is a recent phenomenon.

Still, the

grovTth of the government demonstrates the necessity of staffers in order
to help the president accomplish his job.

Yet lobbying Congress became

more difficult after 1973.
Like the Carter administration. Congress reacted to the effects of
Watergate.

VJhile Congress has always tended to mistrust presidential
17

leadership, the Watergate scandal exacerbated their suspicion.

After

Nixon's resignation, a whole new class of independent minded politicians
took their seats in Congress.

Though many of the newcomers were

Democrats, they raised their own money, ran their o%vn campaigns, and
thus had little loyalty to the Democratic P a r t y . P a r t of Carter's
problem with Capitol Hill over his legislative proposals originated from
this increased assertiveness of congressional members.

19

The more independent legislators are, the less deferential they are
to presidential leadership.

The autonomous legislator tends to become

more attentive to constituency needs and demands. One Nixon
administration aide remarked that "Congress certainly isn't going to
be...sympathetic" to the president's agenda because they have their own
constituents to think about and their own political agendas which differ
from the president's g o a l s . A s

a result, the ability of the chief

executive to build legislative coalitions becomes more difficult because
congressional members are more responsive to their constituents than to
him.

The new political class heightened legislative difficulties and

tensions between legislators and the President.

This reality only

enhanced the importance of maintaining good relations.

But Carter did

not appreciate the importance of the legislative branch in general.
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Thus, his problems with Congress did not solely originate from Watergate
and congressional mistrust.
As Governor of Georgia, Carter developed a negative impression of
the state's legislators.

During one presidential campaign stop on a

farm in South Dakota, a reporter asked whether the cows reminded him of
Georgia's legislators.
intelligent."

21

Carter replied,

"No, they're [the cows] more

He appeared to hold much of this same disdain for the

» ,

United States Congress.

He believed that Congress could not assist in

formulating his programs because doing so would violate the public
trust.

22

He saw the presidential office as above the influences of

special interests that plagued congressional politics.

The President

thus frequently attempted to bypass Congress by appealing directly to
the public for support.

Nevertheless, while the people elect the

president. Congress is the only body that can pass the chief executive's
initiatives into law.

The executive must communicate with, and respect,

the legislative branch in order to build coalitions.
getting a bill through Congress is difficult.

In meiny respects

As President John F.

Kennedy explained:
It is very easy to defeat a bill in the Congress.
It is
much more difficult to pass one. To go through a
subcommittee... and get a majority vote, the full committee
and get a majority vote, go to the Rules committee and get a
rule, go to the floor of the House and get a majority, start
all over again in the Senate, subcommittee and full
committee, and in the Senate there is unlimited debate, so
you can never bring a matter to a vote if there is enough
determination on the part of the opponents, even if they are
a minority, to go through the Senate with the bill. And
then unanimously get a conference between the House and
Senate to adjust the bill, or if one member objects, to have
it go back through the Rules Committee, back through
Congress, and have this done on a controversial piece of
legislation where powerful groups are opposing it, that is
an extremely difficult task.
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Congress must be courted into partnership.

24

The president, along

with the Office of Congressional Relations, provides the means for
overcoming the divisions that exist between the executive and
legislative branches.

Working with legislators entails a "social

exchange" between the chief executive and members of C o n g r e s s . B o t h
institutions request support for the various programs advanced by each
branch.

Former Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, observed the

essential nature of this exchange in an interview with Bill Moyers :

Clifford: ...if a president fulfills his obligation, then he must
have a program. And if he has a program, then he must try
to get the Congress to pass the program. And in doing
that, there occurs one of the most skillful areas...So
you've got a program. You want to get it through. You
have an energy program. You have a civil rights program.
You have a human rights programs. A president has to have
a program. He absolutely flounders if he doesn't know
politics.
Moyers ;

Which is trading, which is compromise....which is
persuading.

Clifford: Sure. Which is saying, 'I have certain things that you
want. But you have certain things that I want. And I
will work out arrangements with you in which you will get
some of what you want if you will give me some of what I
want. ' And it goes very nicely. And what you do, too,
is you invite congressmen to the White House for
dinner.,.And after a while you can call [the congressman]
in. And [the president] says, 'Does that law partner of
yours still want to be a federal judge?'
'Oh,' he says,
'he certainly does.'
'Well,' he says, 'you know I've
been thinking about that lately and we're going to talk
cibout that. But in the process of talking about that, I
want to talk with you about the fact that I think we've
got to increase our Social Security program.' 'Well. Mr.
President. I've spoken against that.' 'Well, I know Joe.
But times have changed. And you think about it awhile,
you see. Let a week go by, you call me.' Joe calls him
in a week and says, 'Mr. President I've been thinking
about that and I think there's a lot of merit to your
position. And I believe I can change on the Social
Security. I want to come over and talk to you. And,
incidentally. I talked to my partner, and he is just
tickled to death.' Now people say. 'Well, that's
politics.' That's the way the country runs. That's the
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way business runs... That's the way our government runs.
[It] is that you're constantly trading back and forth to
get your program.

The president cannot be the sole player in the exchange process
with Capitol Hill.

With 535 members of Congress, the chief executive

cannot possibly deal with all the representatives.

Therefore, the

Office of Congressional Relations assists the president in communicating
with Congress.
Carter and his Relationship with the OCR

President Carter had a very distcint relationship with his Office of
Congressional Relations.

Carter was an introvert and tended to withdraw

from most people in the administration.

27

Because he tended to isolate

himself from staff members, he did not communicate with them
extensively.

Barbara Kellerman states that a president's lobbying team

is a reflection of the man:
his staff become withdrawn.

If a president is withdrawn, so too will
2S

It is difficult for a liaison team to

lobby for programs, though, if the staffers are withdrawn from the very
people they need to lobby.
Since Carter was an introvert, he not only refused to play the
political game, but also failed to make sure others played the game for
him and bargained on behalf of him.

The lack of communication between

the President and his liaisons became evident soon after the election.
Once elected, a president's staff receives a flood of requests from
Congress to have their political supporters appointed to governmental
positions.

The nomination of congressional supporters warms the

negotiating atmosphere between Capitol Hill and the White House by
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fostering goodwill on the part of the Congress member.

Fulfilling some

of the representative's wishes opens the door for the administration to
capitalize on the good relationship with legislators by asking, in the
future, for support of legislative proposals.

Capturing early support

from the legislature requires the OCR to hit the ground running by being
prepared to handle the influx of requests.

The congressional liaison

office must field the flood of calls and correspondence, and establish
communication with Congress.

But the OCR's head liaison, Frank Moore,

without having much contact with the President, did not have a clear
idea of what to expect after the election.
In the administration's first week of office, Moore received
hundreds of calls and over 1,100 letters.^®

Moore found himself

immediately behind in the requests for favors and members of Congress.
These members of Congress frowned on Carter's lack of responsiveness to
these requests and thus viewed the incoming administration with
suspicion that it would be combative with the Hill.

VJhen Moore failed

to return the calls and correspondences of several legislators, they
believed Carter intended to treat the Congress hostilely.

31

For

example. Oversight Committee Chairman, Representative John E. Moss, who
had a reputation as an outspoken foe of government corruption but who
supported open government processes, tried to call several staff offices
and did not receive any return calls.
behind the avalanche of requests.

Moss hoped the staff just got

But after a lengthy period of time

without a return call, he believed Carter's staff was employing
stonewalling tactics like Nixon employed in order to thwart the
legislature's will.^Z

During the Nixon administration, chief of staff

H.R. Haldeman came under fire for erecting a "Berlin Wall" around the
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president.

33

In a similar way Carter's distant relationship with the

OCR fostered ill will between the OCR and Congress because the Hill saw
the President as erecting another "Berlin Wall."

Because of Carter's

continued reticence, his staff did not know how to consult and bargain
with congressional members.

This negative perception of the OCR on

Capitol Hill eventually spilled over to affect their opinion of other
White House staffers.
Carter was in office for only one week when House Speaker Thomas
" T i p " O'Neill complained that the White House failed to consult
adequately with Congress.

34

The problems with the Speaker began when

the White House staff denied O'Neill inaugural tickets with favorable
seating customarily provided for congressional leaders.

The

administration fueled the controversy by replying publicly that O'Neill
received his tickets but wanted more.

Hamilton Jordan stated that if

O'Neill did not like his tickets he should exchange them for a refund.
Insulted, the Speaker began referring to Carter's assistant as
"Hannibal Jerkin.
petty little things

O'Neill responded:

"if

you're going to do

like this you have no respect for me as a Speaker or

as an individual... the problem with the people around Carter is that
they spend so much of their time running against Washington they don't
know they are now part of Washington.

Tony Lake, a staffer in the

State Department under Cyrus Vance, explained the administration's
error;

"Washington hates it when presidents don't treat it with the

respect it believes
In addition to
angered the Speaker.

it deserves.
the

negative perceptions of staff. Carter

personally

In their first meeting. Carter did not give the

impression that he would work with the legislature.

For example, the
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President stated that, when pressed, he would go over the heads of
legislators and appeal to the public directly instead of cutting a deal
with congressional leaders.

The Speaker replied that if he followed

through on his threat, it would only further alienate legislators.^®
Carter also angered O'Neill by appointing two Republicans from
Massachusetts.

He named Eliot Richardson as Ambassador-at-Large, and

Edith J, Dobelle as Chief of Protocol at the State Department.®^
O'Neill responded that " a s a Democrat. I'm upset that the first two
appointments from Massachusetts are Republicans."^®
quipped,

The Speaker

" w e won the election, but you'd never know it.

Carter’s unwillingness to communicate with the OCR, combined with
his attitude towards Congress, created a tenuous atmosphere which made
make it more difficult for the VThite House to get legislation passed by
Congress.

Many of the problems Carter and his liaison team experienced

with the Hill upon taking office surfaced with the presentation of his
energy initiative.
Carter and the Energy Bill

VJhen Carter entered office in 1977, the nation was faced with an
energy crisis.
oil on its own.

The United States could not meet the domestic demand for
To meet the need for oil, the United States had to

import one-third of its oil from the Arab countries.

In 1973 the nation

imported six million gallons of oil— roughly half of all the oil the
citizenry consumed.*^®

By 1974, the energy needs deepened resulting from

the Arab oil embargo and the formation of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC).

After his election. Carter stated that he
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would have an energy plan ready to present to Congress within ninety
days of the inauguration to deal with the crisis.
The President asked James Schlesinger, a Republican economist and
former Nixon and Ford cabinet member, to work on a comprehensive energy
program.

Schlesinger balked at the limited amount of time allowed to

put together a program, but, as one aide commented, the President
thought that people worked better when operating against a tight
deadline.However,

Schlesinger lamented that he could not develop a

detailed plan and get Congress and other interest groups on board to
support the plan within the ninety days.
maintained the deadline.

Nevertheless, Carter

After making the initial public announcement,

however, he removed the issue from public debate by falling almost
silent on its development.

His discussions about the bill were limited

to vague references and sketchy details.

Not only did his staff not

know what the proposal included, but he also refused to include
legislators in the policy formation of the bill.

45

Carter reasoned that

the secrecy would decrease the amount of time to put together a proposal
by avoiding an "inside the beltway" uproar that would inevitably come
when the administration released the plan.

46

On February 2, 1977, Carter went on national television and asked
the American people to conserve energy.

On February 22, he told a

bipartisan group of congressional leaders that he had almost completed
the outline of the energy program and would reveal the contents in a
major speech to Congress in mid-April.

While he said that he needed

congressional help in passing the bill, he refused to let them know what
they might vote on.

After the meeting, several members of Congress

criticized the President publicly for keeping the plan secret.
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White House staffers were kept in the dark about the plan.

Carter

ordered Schlesinger to "refrain from contact with other parts of the
government— both Capitol Hill and the executive branch.

One staffer

lamented that only Schlesinger and some White House staff knew what the
plan looked like.^

Many legislators beseeched the President for

inclusion in the policy process.

A frustrated Robert Byrd, the Senate

Majority Leader, asked Carter on April 5 whether he consulted any
legislators in developing the energy bill.
the bill surviving the Senate.

Offended, Byrd did not see

Still, the plan arrived on time to

Congress.
On April 18, 1977, Carter went on national television to give an
"unpleasant talk" and present the plan to the public.^®

He described

the energy situation as one that required public sacrifice;

higher

prices and higher taxes were necessary to bring about an end to
unlimited energy consumption.

He stated:

We do have a choice about how we will spend the next few
years. Each American uses the energy equivalent of 60
barrels of oil per person each year. Ours is the most
wasteful nation on earth. We waste more energy than we
import..,
I am sure each of you will find something you don't like
about the specifics of our proposal.
It will demand that we
make sacrifices and changes in every life. To some degree
it will be painful....It will lead to some higher costs, and
to some greater inconvenience for everyone.

He said that the plan would test the character of the American people
and that the difficult effort resembled the "moral equivalent of
war. "52
On April 20 he addressed a joint session of Congress in an apparent
attempt to underscore the seriousness of the crisis, but he did not
speak as apocolyptically as he did on the 18th.

Instead, he emphasized
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that the initiative would protect jobs and the environment.

The

contrasting messages confused Congress in light of the television
address two nights earlier.

Some questioned the administration's

competence because of the switch in focus.

53

Even thought the bill

included tax credits for those who insulated their homes and provided
incentives for development of alternative fuels to reduce domestic
dependence on foreign oil, other legislators became concerned over the
proposal's tax increases on natural gas, owners of older cars or gas
guzzlers, and domestic oil.
Given its size, the bill traversed several congressional committee
jurisdictions.

Carter was surprised to l e a m that the energy proposal

might be considered by as many as seventeen committees and sub
committees in the House of Representatives alone.
Senator Byrd warned the President that the Senate would have to
halt all other work to handle the energy package.

Undaunted, Carter

insisted that the Congress consider the entire proposal and added that
he would not accept anything less.

Vfhen one reporter queried, in

response to Carter's intentions, that legislative success required a
long cmd hard battle with Capitol Hill, Carter interrupted "it's one I
don't intend to lose."^^
The President's resolve to propose the bill in its entirety did not
bode well for the administration.

His attitude solidified the

perception inside the beltway that he did not intend to work with the
legislators.
input.

By keeping the proposal secret he neglected congressional

By not providing his own staff with information on the bill, the

OCR could not g a m e r support to advance the legislation on the Hill.
Aside from Schlesinger's continual lobbying efforts and testifying
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before various committees, few staffers worked on behalf of the
p r o p o s a l . T h e r e f o r e , upon entering the House, the energy package did
not have much support.

Complicating the chances for success, the

administration's lobbying efforts dwindled because Carter believed the
Congress would act on the proposal favorably.

Therefore, the energy

package left the Oval Office without the White House to guide it through
the legislature.
Speaker Tip O'Neill took it upon himself to assist Carter by
appointing an ad hoc committee to facilitate the administration's desire
for consideration of the energy package as one complete bill.

At one

point Carter called O'Neill to ask whether he should go on television to
denounce some congressmen whose committees he believed gutted the
bill.^"^

Carter was "perplexed and frustrated by the complexity of the

legislative process and the Democrats lack of loyalty to his
leadership."

58

He believed that the House of Representatives wanted to

compete, not cooperate, with the White House.

The Speaker convinced the

President, however, that the bill would turn out virtually identical to
the one the administration proposed.

O'Neill's leadership and skill at

building coalitions kept the bill moving through the House with minor
conflicts.

At the Speaker's urging. Carter dispatched four lobbyists to

the House.

Carter even made personal phone calls, and wrote letters to

House members to support the package.
House passed the proposal.
leadership for its passage.

Four days later, on August 5, the

Many credited the Speaker's guidance and
But Carter did not l e a m from O'Neill's

legislative persuasion when the bill moved to the Senate.
In the Senate, the administration reverted back to silence on the
issue and did not appoint lobbyists to see the package through.
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Further, complicating the legislative process. Senator Russell Long (DLouisiana), the powerful Finance Committee Chairman, opposed the tax
increases in the bill.

Even though Long, who represented one of the

largest oil and gas producing states, feared that the energy package
would harm his state's economy, the White House did not make an attmpt
to cut a deal with him.

He announced his plan to modify significantly

the plan's increased taxation of industry.

Even more disheartening for

the administration, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources committees
wanted to review the bill as well.

The more committees that requested

to review the bill, the more opposition the bill would likely face.
In October 1977, the situation worsened when Senate liberals
invoked the first filibuster in thirteen years to stave off deregulation
of gas prices proposed by Senator Long.

But even though Vfhite House

supporters of the initiative started the filibuster, the administration
moved to quash the stalling tactic.

Carter wanted to get the bill

through Congress as quickly as possible.

In a telephone conversation

with Senator Dale Bumpers, the President struck a deal to let the
liberals back out of the legislative maneuver g r a c e f u l l y . S i n c e the
filibuster was started by supporters of the administration's version,
not to allow them to quit the filibuster on their own volition would be
embarrassing.

However, Senator Byrd and Vice-President Walter Hondale

moved to kill the filibuster without warning the Senate liberals.
Administration supporters believed that Carter betrayed them.

Those who

planned to end the debate as per Carter's agreement with Bumpers became
angry at the President's double-cross to force an end to the filibuster
without warning.

For example, an enraged Senator James Abourezk from

South Dakota called the president a " l i a r . " ^ ^

The New Republic wrote
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that Mondale's "dismantling of the filibuster conducted by allies of
the administration...assured that nothing resembling a Carter energy
bill [would]... emerge from [the Senate].

Even though Carter

addressed the nation again claiming that that the energy legislation did
not represent a contest of strength between him and Congress, the
filibuster debacle assured that nothing close to Carter's original
proposal would come out of the Senate.
After the end of the filibuster in the Senate, Carter sensed the
proposal's opposition mounting.

To speed passage of the bill. Carter

instructed his staff and cabinet secretaries to lobby for the bill.
Carter also took a more active role in the lobbying effort in hopes of
counteracting the damage caused by ending the filibuster.®^
On October 31, the Senate passed the initiative fifty-two to
thirty-five.

However, the Senate bill did not resemble the House

version, much less Carter's original proposal.

Further, the chances of

getting a bill Carter could sign seemed minute because the House-Senate
conference committee members were split on many points in the proposal.
In response, the President canceled a trip overseas for fear that the
compromise energy package would fail in his absence.

Canceling the

foreign visits three weeks before his scheduled departure embarrassed
the administration because of the short notice, but the President wanted
to make sure he would have a bill he could comfortably sign before the
new year.
Carter again encouraged Schlesinger to lobby on behalf of the bill.
In a November 21 press conference, the Energy Secretary stated that
Carter might make significant concessions to get the comprehensive
package through Congress.

The Vfhite House tried to distance themselves
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from Schlesinger's comment.

Jody Powell replied that "anyone who

believes the President will sign a bad bill is seriously mistaken...no
bill may be better than a bad bill.
"no mood to compromise."

Carter added that he was in

These contradictory statements reinforced

the conclusion that the President was isolated and did not communicate
with his staff.

The conflicting statements projected an image of a

Vfhite House in disarray.

Conceding that passage of the plan remote.

Carter left for his foreign tour on December 29, 1977.
President vowed to try again when he returned.

But the

Reflecting on this time

period. Carter wrote that the energy debacle "was one of my few major
disappointments of the year, but it was serious, because everyone
realized the bills were our most important legislation."

68

Because of its impotence, the administration went to work again on
the proposal.

January 1978 began on an upbeat note.

Carter began to

reach out and bargain with the members of Congress and more actively
recruited public support.

However, despite the early optimism,

enthusiasm for the bill d w i n d l e d . I n s t e a d of the expected energy
shortages, surpluses surfaced in early 1978.
In late summer the same year, the Carter compromised on the natural
gas portion of the energy package:

prices would increase by fifteen

percent and would be allowed to climb in price each year until 1985.
Carter also began to engage in the bargaining process with the Hill in
other ways.

For the next month-and-a-half the administration

coordinated its activities regarding the bill.

Every morning, the White

House lobbying teams met in Moore's East Wing office to plot the day's
s t r a t e g y . S i n c e the energy crisis seemed over, the administration no
longer tried to sell its program as the "moral equivalent of war."
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Instead the '/ftiite House adopted the stance that passage of the energy
bill would halt the recent slide of the dollar and inflation.

The White

House also insisted that getting the whole package out of conference
would signal to other nations that the United States could put its ovm
house in order. Carter announced that "the entire world is looking at
our government to see whether we have the national will to deal with
this difficult challenge.

If this legislation is not enacted, it will

have a devastating effect on our national image, the value of the
dollar, our balance of trade, and inflation."

71

Eventually, Carter signed the five-part compromise legislation
passed on October 15, 1978— one year, six months, and nineteen days
after sending it to Capitol Hill.

The energy battle with Congress ended

up as one of the longest legislative conflicts in recent times.

72

Even

though he signed the initiative, the bill emerged from conference
without many points that Carter wanted.
Carter's experience with the energy proposal prompted several
criticisms of his administration.
disarray.

Many perceived the Vfhite House in

In response to these criticisms. Carter reexamined his

organizational style.

After signing into law the energy bill. Carter

moved to reorganize his White House.
The President broadened the responsibilities of his personal
advisor, Hamilton Jordan.

Jordan coordinated the activities of the

White House staff, thus freeing Carter to focus on more important
matters.

By April of 1978 the White House severely curtailed the

Cabinet's authority to appoint their own subordinates.

All department

policies and speeches had to go through Jordan's and/or Stuart
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Eizenstat's office for approval.

Carter also began directing people,

who previously had unlimited access to him, to Jordan or Eizenstat.
Despite the improvements in the administration, countless
criticisms still emanated from within the administration.

These

critiques convinced Carter that he needed to further reorganize.

The

White House therefore began to include Congress in the formation of its
policy initiatives.

However, the internal workings of the executive

were still tumultuous.
The constant bickering between cabinet members and White House
staffers intensified as the energy bill came out of conference in 1978.
Several cabinet secretaries stepped up their criticisms of the White
House and made statements contrary to Vfhite House policy.

The Secretary

of Agriculture announced higher price supports for grain than the White
House determined necessary.

The Secretary of the Treasury said there

would be no tax reforms yet the administration was putting together
reform p a c k a g e s . T h e disjunction between the administration and
cabinet thus exacerbated the disarray in the executive and alienated and
confused the Congress.

In an attempt to get the cabinet and staff

working together, several meetings were arranged.
In a meeting between staffers and department secretaries. Jack
Watson, the Assistant for Cabinet and Intergovernmental Affairs,
exclaimed that "the erosion of our loyalty to each other is eroding our
loyalty to the president.

The Secretary of the Treasury, Ted

Blumenthal, disagreed, claiming that there was a big difference between
arguing for a point and disloyalty. Carter hardly listened.

Carter

stated that he was bothered by the lack of "team spirit" and cohesion.
Eventually, the President announced that he wanted to review many of his
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appointments and fire those who were no longer reliable.

Jordan then

distributed to the cabinet secretaries and staff heads some "tough
forms" for them to complete.

76

They contained thirty questions for

staff heads or cabinet secretaries to evaluate their subordinates.

77

Jordan stated, with Carter's approval, that he wanted each one to
evaluate their subordinates and " g e t rid of those who are
incompetent."

73

When United Nations Ambassador. Andrew Young,

questioned the way Jordan dealt with the issue. Carter questioned
Young's loyalty, thus killing any meaningful comment for the rest of the
meeting.

The Julv Massacre

Disappointed with the length of time taken to get the compromise
energy bill out of Congress, and concerned with the perception of an
ineffective administration. Carter went to Camp David to discuss with
several friends and advisors the effectiveness of his term.

Since he

told everyone why he was going to Camp David, rumors ran rampant back in
Washington as several staffers wondered who might be fired.

This only

exacerbated the already disorganized atmosphere in the White House.
VIhile at Camp David, many of Carter's advisors told him that he
delegated too much authority to the cabinet and that he seemed bogged
down in the details of the administration.

79

Carter decided to restaff

and reorganize the White House.
On July 15, 1979, Carter delivered a televised speech to the
nation.

He stated that he had failed to lead the nation properly and as

a result the country was in the midst of a "crisis of confidence." but
that he would restore the public's confidence in government and his
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administration.

80

Two days later. Carter demanded pro-forma

resignations from all cabinet secretaries and senior staffers.

Despite

warnings from some inside the VJhite House that the move would seem too
much like Nixon's demand for resignations in 1972, Carter went ahead
with the plan.
to accept.

He told them that he would evaluate whose resignations

The President eventually "accepted' the resignation of so

many staffers and secretaries that it resulted in the largest turnover
in the executive since 1841.81

fired half his cabinet.

House turnover became known as the "July Massacre.

The White

Carter and

Jordain believed that the bold changes in the administration would
buttress the President's image both in the eyes of the public and
Congress.

However, instead of building Carter's reputation with the

Hill, it worked in reverse.

House Majority Leader, James Wright (D-

Tex), said the resignations demonstrated the administration's
instability.
On July 17, the President also announced that Hamilton Jordan would
formerly become Chief of Staff.
organizational plan.

Jordan suggested to Carter a new

Jordan called for better cooperation between the

White House and cabinet and better staff coordination.

84

This

centralization signaled Vfhite House determination to keep the
departments and the Oval Office focused on the same goals.

Jordan's

plan signaled the rejection of cabinet government, and ended unlimited
access to the President.

Jordan coordinated policy, included staff in

the lobbying process, settled disputes, and read and summarized staff
memorandum. However, it was the firing of some of the most experienced
Washington politicians reinforced the perception espoused by Wright.
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Joseph Califano and Michael Blumenthal were among the first who
were fired.

Jordan elevated the controversy over the changes when he

said on the " MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour" about Califano's firing that
"you don't see me crying" and added,
-it's a question of competence."®^

"it's not a question of loyalty-

Ralph Nader responded that letting

Califano go "was like firing Mickey Mantle because he couldn't get
along with the bat boy."®®

But Carter reinforced the perception of

disarray by stating in response to Jordan's interview that Califano had
done an outstanding job for the administration.
The controversy over the firings prompted other appointees to
criticize the administration.

In an obvious critique of Jordan's new

organizational authority. Secretary of Transportation Brock Adams stated
his "reservations about the responsiveness of those with enhanced
authority at the White House to the Congress, and the American
people."

87

When Jordan heard of Brock's comment, the Treasury

Secretary was fired.

The same day James Schlesinger, the one largely

responsible for putting together the energy package, received word the
President had "accepted" his resignation.

These high profile

"resignations" caused the media to question Carter's stability as
president.

In the final analysis, the staff criticisms, and ultimately

the firings, resulted from Carter's organizational approach.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

Carter wrote in his autobiography that "there was never a moment
when I did not consider the creation of a national energy policy equal
in importance to any other goal we had.

Thus, the administration's

failure to get the proposal they wanted reflected poorly on Carter's
political skill.

The bitter struggle with Congress left Carter without

fond memories of the energy battle with Congress;

In looking back on the moral equivalent of war against
energy, waste and excessive vulnerability...1 see nothing
exhilarating.
It was a bruising fight, and no final clearcut victory could be photographed and hung on the wall for
our grandchildren to admire.

His energy package capped a bitter struggle with Congress.

Clearly.

President Carter had become frustrated with the political process in
VJashington.

The final bill did not include many of the major provisions

Carter had proposed.^

For example, the final bill did not raise as many

taxes on various energy sources as Carter wanted.

Also, the bill

deregulated the natural gas industry while Carter wanted regulation.
Carter's image " a s a bumbling legislator had become well
established [in Congress]...by 1 9 79 ."^

Since the "Ju ly Massacre"

helped to solidify this opinion, some House Democrats began a "Dump
Carter, Draft Kennedy movement"

to challenge Carter in the primaries."

Carter's Organizational Problems and Lessons

This thesis has addressed two major questions:
1. How the management of Carter's staff affected the likelihood of
congressional passage of legislation, and
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2. The lessons from the Carter administration are useful in
learning how to manage and organize future White House staffs.

The experience of Carter's energy bill demonstrates the important
relationship between the organization of staff and legislative success.
Without a properly managed staff, the chances a president will pass his
proposals is decreased.
The criticisms of Carter's administration focused on three
elements:

(1) the Congressional Liaison Office's ineffective lobbying,

(2) Carter's mismanagement of not prioritizing his legislative agenda
for the OCR, and (3) his unwillingness to compromise.^

These criticisms

illustrate the importance of establishing good congressional relations.
VThile the constitutional relationship between the executive and
legislative branches was designed for conflict, the White House can
minimize the discord by organizing the administration before taking
office.

Carter admitted he did

not approach the

constitutional reality in mind.

To make matters

realize how fragmented Congress

had become after

legislature withthis
worse he did not
Watergate.

As a

result, his approach only exacerbated the tensions between Congress and
the Oval Office.

Nevertheless, he thought that he could persuade

Congress to pass his legislation by demonstrating his intellect.
Believing that knowledge of the issues would prevail over politics.
Carter neglected the liaison's office.

As a result, the staff spent

much of their time just trying to l e a m how to do their job.

7

The

decentralization of power, combined with the final decision-making
authority in the Oval Office, promoted a multitude of semi-autonomous
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fiefdonns quarreling among themselves.

The disorder within the executive

branch confused Congress as to what the President wanted.
His perception of Congress contributed to the poor relationship
between the Hill and Vïhlte House staffers:
to the Congress-"®

he " f e l t morally superior

Carter believed that there was something

fundamentally corrupt about the governmental Washington politics.

He

thought that national problems grew because of irresponsible legislators
in D.C.

He believed that Washington politicians were beholden to

special interests and thus could not pass laws that were in the best
interests of the country.

According to Cyrus Vance, this contempt for

Congress fed his hostility for the institution.

For instance, when

someone told Carter that he should slow down on the reforms he planned
and pursue more incremental change, he replied "it's people like you
that I've been sent to Washington to shape up.
Carter believed that only the president could act out of concern
for the whole country.

Carter said before his 1976 election that " I

Wcint them [members of Congress] to know that we represent the same
people.

There's no one in any congressional district in the nation that

won't be my constituent if I become president...I want to do a good job
for them."^®

This statement offended members of Congress because of

Carter's arrogant way of stating it.

Carter did not understand that

legislators, especially after winning a tough campaign, believe that no
one else can know their constituents and geographical area as they do.^^
Still, the President had firm ideas about the policies he wanted
enacted, and therefore was always hesitant to compromise or include
anyone in the negotiating process.
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By not appreciating the nature of Congress, the administration
failed to establish the connection necessary to increase its chances of
legislative success.

Carter was not willing to work with Congress and

therefore did not gain knowledge of how they worked.

By remaining

reticent throughout much of his term he failed to flatter or pressure
them when necessary.

12

Democrats became offended.

They believed his

proposals were made at the expense of consensus within his own party.
This resentment was reinforced when Carter invited a ranking Republican
and several junior Democrat and Republican members to join him in a
signing ceremony but did not invite any of the Democratic leadership.
The President thus thought that because he had familiarized himself with
the details of the issues in the best interests of the nation. Congress
should support his programs.

For example, he told Jack Nelson, the

Washington Bureau Chief of the Los Angeles Times, that when congressmen
came to him about certain policies, they had better know the substance
and details of the programs because he sure did.
approach as pragmatic:

15

Carter regarded his

if one can find the best policy, persuasion

would naturally follow, and the program would pass.
lead by simply being c o r r e c t . H e

He thought he could

advanced programs based solely on

merit.
Carter's failure to appreciate Congress affected the way he
organized his staff.

Because the President ignored the importance of

Congress, he did not take time to communicate with the Office of
Congressional Relations (OCR).

Because Carter did not organize his

liaison's to bargain with the Congress, legislators believed that the
White House did not treat them as important people in their own right.
Administrations must have the capability of influencing Congress because
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the White House cannot claim victories for much of anything without its
consent.

This political reality makes it essential for the White House

to develop a good relationship with the House and Senate.

One political

science scholar stated that:
Because they [the Carter administration] did not recognize
the importance of coalition-building through brokerage, they
did not, at the very outset of the administration, make an
effort to establish cooperative lobbying relationships with
the other important participants in the legislative
process...Since these relationships were not established,
the White House had to rely on its own resources to obtain
legislative success.
Therefore, legislative defeats
resulted.
And these defeats fed upon themselves, creating
the image of ineptitude, in turn has led to members of
Congress being less willing to rely on Vfhite House judgments
and to accept White House analysis of issues.

Carter did not understand something President Johnson practiced:
only way to deal with Congress is "continuously,
without interruption. "

the

incessantly, and

Rather, Carter seemed hesitant to get

involved in the political process.

Carter's liaison team did not

attempt to discover their concerns emd failed to cultivate congressional
support for executive proposals.

Without the President's direction, the

OCR did not know how to politic on the chief executive's behalf.
Before his loss to Ronald Reagan in the election of 1980, Carter
acknowledged that his initial approach to Congress was wrong:
I think just a few personal moves on my part— treating
Congress members as though they were presidents themselves,
returning their telephone calls, letting my staff members
respect them thoroughly, dealing with the problems that they
presented to me, making my own presence felt in the Capitol
building itself on occasion, would be contributions that
might alleviate the present disharmony and total separation
of the Vfhite House... and Congress.

Yet this realization came too late to save Carter's presidency.
example explains two of the earlier criticisms from the Hill:
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he did not believe he needed to compromise with Congress, the OCR was
left to organize itself.

In essence the White House failed to make sure

the OCR performed its duties;

lobbying and communicating with Capitol

Hill and making sure the OCR knows what the president wants and how he
expects the liaison to carry out the job.

To engage in an exchange

with Congress requires a response to congressional requests to create a
sympathetic context for consideration of White House initiatives.

22

Carter eventually realized that he needed to articulate a coherent
vision for both his staff and for the Congress.

Jordan echoed this

realization and said after the 1980 defeat that Carter should have set
priorities and not jumped into the many issues he found important.
White House staffer Richard Harden said that they tried to do too many
things and thus ended up not doing anything well.

The Chief of Staff

stated that advancing several policy fronts only confused the public,
the Congress, and those inside the White House.

As a result. Congress

had to piece together the "domestic agenda with minimal White House
impact" on the issues.^4

Many issues and proposals got lost in the

complex and overloaded legislative process on the Hill.

Without help

from the liaison's office. White House initiatives competed for
congressional attention with other bills introduced by members of
Congress.
Because of the immense amount of legislation emanating from the
White House, the President's staffers spent much of their time trying to
l e a m what the Chief Executive wanted accomplished.

25

Cabinet

secretaries tried to decipher what Carter wanted, but had " n o clear
sense of where the President was leading.

The plethora of bills

emanating from the White House, and the lack of clarity regarding
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Carter's goals, greatly complicated the lobbying successes of the
administration.

He added that a system to monitor projects did not

exist and that Carter did not sit down with the staff to organize them
and lay out how the administration should work together.

on

The problems the administration experienced over the energy debate
also illustrates the importance of getting off to a quick and smooth
start.

Stuart Eizenstat offered insight about the necessity of

"hitting the ground running":

" I don't think Carter's image ever

recovered from some of those early m i s t a k e s . P r e s i d e n t Lyndon
Johnson's once said about the importance of the transition period that:
You've got to give it all you can that first year [and it]
doesn't matter what kind of a majority you come with.
You've got just one year when they treat you right, and
before they start worrying about themselves.
The third year
you lose votes...The fourth year's all politics.

Johnson understood that presidents have only one year to establish their
effectiveness at getting legislation through Congress.

The chief

executive must be able to capitalize on the electoral success early on
to increase legislative victories.

The Carter presidency demonstrates

what happens when chief executives approach government transition and
management distantly.^®
On many other bills of lesser importance Carter did achieve
victories, but the press picked up on his lack of success by stating
that if the President did not get what he wanted, he would be perceived
as ineffective.
Carter's attitude toward Congress explains why it took so long for
him to l e a m the ropes of effectively passing legislation.

The major

flav/ resided in his unwillingness to consult members of Congress about
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White House proposals.

For instance, he could have avoided a compromise

on the natural gas tax in the energy bill had he consulted two committee
chairs reviewing the increases.

32

Congress prefers consultation so they

can take credit for helping formulate the plan or avoid blame if the
proposal does not have a legislator's constituent's support.
Consultation allows legislators to affect a bill— generating ownership—
so that the representative's constituents might support a piece of
legislation.

In this sense, politicians can take credit back in their

home states for helping the president formulate a good piece of
legislation.

The representative or senator can gain electoral support

for the next state election. Carter did not taike into consideration the
need for legislators to protect their constituent's interests.
Consultation and bargaining also assist the president's agenda
because, once many members come on board, the VThite House has support
for its proposals.

Unfortunately, Carter neglected the practice of

negotiating with Capitol Hill.

Legislators thus became less willing to

rely on, and accept. White House analyses and proposals on important
issues.

33

Staffers had only a vague sense of what the administration planned
legislatively.

Carter did not develop a coherent and consistent

strategy or relay his methodology of advancing the goals of the White
House to the liaison staff.

For a majority of the energy battle, the

OCR was confused about their role in the legislative process.

For

example, Frank Moore said that the administration failed to define the
internal staff procedures; therefore. Congress had no idea who to talk
to and negotiate with.^^

He lacked salesmanship and neglected to use

his lobbying offices to assist in the advance of his program.
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to organize and enlist the OCR's assistance in forwarding the energy
package, he lacked supporters when he spoke at the joint session of
Congress on April 20.
Several members of Congress criticized Congressional Liaison, Frank
Moore, for being " p o o r l y organized, displaying lack of knowledge and
understanding of Congress, and failing to exploit the resources
available to the administration [through consultation]."

35

While some

singled out Moore as a poor legislative liaison because of his
inexperience and failure to respond to the legislature's complaints.
others had no idea the administration had a congressional liaison.

Well

into the second year of Carter's term, Moore invited the Democratic
leaders to meet the administration's top aides.
himself, one congressional leader asked:

After introducing

" W h o are you? "

Some suggested that Carter appointed Moore " o n the basis of his
needs rather than on the basis of congressional needs. "

37

Presumably,

the President chose Moore because of his desire for staff loyalty,
rather than staff competence and experience in the ways Washington
politics operated.

Carter did not fill his top posts with professionals

but rather loyalists from Georgia who did not know how to advance
initiatives inside the beltway.
problems with Congress.

This inexperience exacerbated the

These Georgian outsiders came to Washington

rejecting the ''folkways of the Capital"

and they made it clear to the

Democratic establishment that they were not needed.
At least one congressional aide believed that the "Georgia Mafia"
had the capability to understand the way Washington worked:
isn't ignorance, it's arrogance.

"This

/ 39
They don't really like Congress."

Indeed, the OCR just did not ask members of Congress if there was
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anything that they could do for them.

Another aide commented that

Moore's staff " d o n ' t seem to understand the mechanics of the art, and
when they do figure out where to apply the pressure, it is usually too
late.
members.

The OCR just did not keep in touch with
They also did not dole

congressional

out favors so the President would

receive favors from Capitol Hill later on.

Simply put, they did not

l e a m to become sensitive to the legislature's needs.
Making matters worse, Ifhite House lobbyists came under criticism
for not understanding the energy program they were dispatched to
advance.

This is not surprising considering the fact that Carter did

not involve them in its formation.

When the OCR did participate late in

1977 and early 1978, they did not have time to go over the details of
the plan.
White House legislative programs suffered because Carter lacked the
foresight to ensure that the OCR clearly understood how to accomplish
its responsibilities.

Carter simply believed that he could capitalize

on the goodwill of the honeymoon period by flooding the legislature with
several p r o p o s a l s . C o n g r e s s rejected many of these bills because the
OCR did not lobby or guide these proposals through the legislative
process.

Given the fact that the OCR did not properly respond to

congressional requests for favors, the administration did not have a
sufficient "r e s e r v o i r "
upon.^^

of goodwill that the Ifhite House could draw

Thus, many legislators reacted to White House programs coolly.

Furthermore, the OCR did not consult legislators while the White House
formed the programs which alienated many from the legislative process.
Carter's style made for a complex legislative agenda without
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facilitating the mechanisms to increase the likelihood of passage of
those programs.

44

Since the functioning of the staff reflects the President's style,
the previous examples explain why Carter did not achieve what he wanted.
While Carter's knowledge concerning details of the issues surpassed
many, he had no idea about how his policies should go together.
When Speaker O'Neill's advised the administration to lobby for the
energy bill, the V/hite House organized and coordinated a lobbying
effort.

As a result, the package passed more easily.

Similarly in the

Senate, even though Carter did not lobby for the issue, when he and his
staffers organized to sell the program, the measure passed.

These two

instances illustrate that, regardless of the administration's
inexperience, they could positively affect the outcomes of their
proposals as long as they put together a planned effort.

The

administration finally gave the Congress what they wanted;

the

opportunity to affect White House legislation and contact with the
administration's staffers.
Learning from his mistakes, in 1978 Carter realized the importance
of the liaison's job.

45

The President began to coordinate his

initiatives with Congress and prioritize the more visible proposals.
Carter even started to politick on his own behalf by making calls to
members and inviting Democratic leaders to the White House to discuss
legislation.

His appointment of Jordan as Chief also displayed his

ability to l e a m and adjust to the political realities.

However, the

President's efforts seemed too little, too late, for by the time he
fully instituted a new organizational structure he had little over a
year to go in his term.
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Possible Problems with Relying on Staff

Maintaining constant communication with such staff offices as the
OCR benefits the president in formulating policy because it airs
differing opinions and exposes errors— thus making decisions more
e f f e c t i v e . S i n c e the liaison team acts as the president's eyes and
ears on Capitol Hill, problems that might arise from legislators are
relayed to the White House.

Solving these problems makes the executive

proposals more likely to pass.
In the modern presidency, the staffers can no longer do everything
and be knowledgeable on all issues.

Because of the complexity of

governmental solutions to domestic problems, one person can no longer
advise on policy, draft legislation, or write s p e e c h e s . V J h i t e House
staffers now act in specialized areas but this begs for VThite House
coordination since it takes more staffers to complete a job.

The

problem is that this specialization of staff has the tendency to tie
staffers too closely to a certain constituency than might be the case if
there existed a more flexible method of distributing staff
assignments.

43

The risk is that a staffer who identifies and deals with one
specific constituency constantly will identify so closely that the
liaison ends up becoming an advocate for the interest inside the White
House.

In a sense, staffers could have the tendency to forget for whom

they worked.

James Rowe, an FDR White House aide, opposed the creation

of a liaison office for this reason.

He argued that as soon as the

staff dealt with a congressional member's requests and complaints that
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the staffer would in effect become the employee of the legislator as
well as the president.
concern:

4Q

Franklin Roosevelt somewhat echoed this

if staffers failed to respond to the requests of legislators.

the members would lose confidence in the White House lobby team and
thus, either way, become ineffective.^®
Richard Neustadt once wrote President-Elect JFK urging him to " g o
slow on staffing up the congressional liaison.

An overorganized White

House liaison operation...tends to turn Presidential staffers into choir
boys for congressmen and bureaucrats alike.
more to risk than gain in my opinion."

51

From this the president has
Seemingly proving Neustadt's

point, Lawrence O'Brien came under fire for overly representing the
interests of Congress in the Kennedy administration.

In the 1980s, one

Reagan staffer was fired for overrepresenting state and local
governments against a proposed round of budget cuts.

CO

similarities to what Nixon experienced with Watergate.

This concern has
As the executive

staff increases in size, they exceed the president's span of control.
The result can be detrimental for an administration as staffers may thus
" g o into business for themselves."

53

One way to decrease the possibility for staffer's to pursue their
ovm agenda is to install a chief of staff.

Carter could not keep up

with the immense workload he tried to tackle.

Carter eventually

realized he needed a more hierarchical staff system " t o impose order on
policy development, guard access to the Oval Office, and settle
administration disputes that are not of presidential importance."

54

Presidents must be freed up to bargain with congressional members, meet
with leaders from the Hill, and make phone calls.

This freedom allows
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the chief executive to cultivate coalitions.

55

However, there are

problems with this system.
Hierarchical systems do risk having too much information being
screened by the staff chief thus leaving the president ill-informed
about major policy issues.

A good chief of staff will expose the chief

executive to differing opinions.

However, a staff chief could easily

quell dissent in the administration and instead substitute his ovm
proposals to the president.
■easy solutions.

In some areas, then, these problems have no

In the end, the way a staff functions is a reflection

of the president.

The Personality of the President

Jack Matson, the Assistant for Cabinet and Intergovernmental
Affairs, stated that " t h e way the Mhite House is organized and the way
that it functions are both very much reflections of the man." ^^
Because the Constitution does so little in bestowing presidential power,
the president must rely on his o^m personal resources.

57

sources of success in an administration are extra-formal.

Therefore, the
Given this

factor, no organizational flow chart can overcome a president's personal
weaknesses.
In order for the president to g a m e r support for his programs, he
must have the willingness to actively pursue his goals.

The most

important characteristic in this arena is the chief executive's
interpersonal skills.

In order to persuade and manipulate others, the

president must be able to communicate well aind use others for his ovm
purposes.

He must be active enough to be able to politick on his ovm

behalf and compromise when the issue demands it.

Many of there skills
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are difficult, to measure, but Barbara Kellerman notes that good
political skills require good timing:

the ability if the president's

initiatives to fit the mood of the moment.
Gathering support for White House programs requires a certain type
of personality.
an extrovert.

Kellerman asserts that a good political leader must be
An extrovert prefers to be in the outer world engaging

others and being active in the environment.

This type of person is

sociable, likes to be with other people, and enjoys social activities.
Since extroverts like to function around others, the skills one
possesses to conduct in a social exchange with others are refined.
These social skills are a must if the president is to get his way.
A president will find it difficult to get his way if he is an
introvert.

A chief executive who prefers to be in small groups of

intimate friends, or to be alone, will more than likely not be able to
get what he wants.

Kellerman puts Carter in this category.

He liked to

isolate himself, did not like to be out in public, had a few intimate
friends and relied on few for advice.

Since he did not pursue social

activities, he had few allies who would lend him political support.
These introvert qualities hurt the effectiveness of his administration.
Kellerman argues that those who are socially inadequate will find
politics a difficult profession.

In order for one to be effective, one

must create and maintain a great number and variety of relationships;
only the extroverted type pursues these kinds of associations.
No organizational structure will be able to overcome the personal
inability of the chief executive.

The questions of whether an

extroverted president will organize his office in such a way that will
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increase legislative success is another question and beyond the scope of
this thesis.
This work illustrated the problems that result from a poorly
organized White House staff.

The question of management will remain

critical as the government increases in size.

Historically, the more

the public wants an activist presidency, the more powers and functions
staffers assume. Given the complex problems facing society, the public
will most likely ask for more governmental assistance.

However, if the

answer to more assistance is the increase in the staff's numbers and
powers, there will be much debate among scholars because of the Nixon
administration's executive excesses.
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